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6 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT FOR THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
7 IN AND FOR WHATCOM COUNTY

8 GENEVIEVE BARDWELL, JEFF
9 EBERLEIN, THOMAS SCHUMANN,
10 JEFFREY KAHN, DANIEL
11 UITDENHOWEN, MICHAEL BARR,
12 LESLIE SWOPE, JOANNE HERMAN and
13 NAOMI LIEBHOLD, individually and on
14 behalf of all others similarly situated,

15 Plaintiff,

16 v.

17 MT. BAKER IMAGING, LLC and
18 NORTHWEST RADIOLOGISTS, INC., P.S.,

19 Defendant.

NO. 25-2-00463-37

CONSOLIDATED CLASS ACTION
COMPLAINT

DEMAND FOR A JURY TRIAL

20 Plaintiffs Genevieve Bardwell, Jeff Eberlein, Thomas Schumann, Jeffrey Kahn, Daniel
21 Uitdenhowen, Michael Barr, Leslie Swope, Joanne Herman and Naomi Liebhold (“Plaintiffs”)
22 bring this Class Action Complaint (“Complaint”) against Mt. Baker Imaging, LLC and
23 Northwest Radiologists, Inc., P.S. (collectively, “Northwest/MBI” or “Defendants”) as
24 individuals and on behalf of all others similarly situated, and allege, upon personal knowledge
25 as to their own actions and their counsel’s investigation, and upon information and belief as to
26 all other matters, as follows:

27 **SUMMARY OF ACTION**

1. Plaintiffs bring this class action against Defendants for their failure to properly
secure and safeguard the sensitive information of their patients.

1 2. Defendant Mt. Baker is a Washington-based healthcare imaging provider that
2 provides “precision imaging tools to local [healthcare] providers.”¹ According to its website,
3 Defendant Mt. Baker uses radiologists from Defendant Northwest Radiologists to interpret the
4 images they collect. As part of their practice, Defendants collected and maintained certain
5 personally identifiable information and protected health information of Plaintiffs and the
6 putative Class Members.
7

8 3. In January 2025, Defendants learned that their computer systems had been
9 compromised (the “Data Breach”). Together with a cybersecurity forensics firm, Defendants
10 determined that “certain data was accessed by an unauthorized party.” This data included
11 protected health information, and specifically, “individuals’ first and last names in combination
12 with address information, telephone number, date of birth, email address, Social Security
13 number, driver’s license or state identification card number, treatment or diagnosis information,
14 provider name, medical record number or patient identification number, health insurance
15 information, and/or treatment cost information” (collectively “Private Information”).²
16

17 4. Plaintiffs’ and Class Members’ sensitive personal information—which they
18 entrusted to Defendants on the mutual understanding that Defendants would protect it against
19 disclosure—was targeted, compromised and unlawfully accessed due to the Data Breach.
20

21 5. As a result of the Data Breach, Plaintiffs and Class Members suffered concrete
22 injuries in fact including, but not limited to: (1) invasion of privacy; (2) theft of their Private
23 Information; (3) lost or diminished value of Private Information; (4) lost time and opportunity
24 costs associated with attempting to mitigate the actual consequences of the Data Breach; (5)
25 loss of benefit of the bargain; (6) actual misuse of their Private Information consisting of an
26

27 ¹ See <https://mtbakerimaging.com/about-us-2/>.

1 increase in spam calls, texts, and/or emails; (7) nominal damages; and (8) the continued and
2 certainly increased risk to their Private Information, which: (a) remains unencrypted and
3 available for unauthorized third parties to access and abuse; and (b) remains backed up in
4 Defendants' possession and is subject to further unauthorized disclosures so long as Defendants
5 fail to undertake appropriate and adequate measures to protect the Private Information.

6
7 6. The Data Breach was a direct result of Defendants' failure to implement
8 adequate and reasonable cyber-security procedures and protocols necessary to protect patients'
9 Private Information from a foreseeable and preventable cyber-attack.

10 7. Moreover, upon information and belief, Defendants were targeted for a cyber-
11 attack due to their status as a healthcare entity that collects and maintains highly valuable
12 Private Information on their systems.

13 8. Defendants maintained, used, and shared the Private Information in a reckless
14 manner. In particular, the Private Information was used and stored by Defendants in a condition
15 vulnerable to cyberattacks. Upon information and belief, the mechanism of the cyberattack—
16 and potential for improper disclosure of Plaintiffs' and Class Members' Private Information—
17 was a known risk to Defendants, and thus, Defendants were on notice that failing to take steps
18 necessary to secure the Private Information from those risks left that property in a dangerous
19 condition.
20

21 9. Defendants disregarded the rights of Plaintiffs and Class Members by, *inter alia*,
22 intentionally, willfully, recklessly, or negligently failing to take adequate and reasonable
23 measures to ensure their data systems were protected against unauthorized intrusions; failing to
24 take standard and reasonably available steps to prevent the Data Breach; and failing to provide
25

26
27 ² <https://mtbakerimaging.com/notification/>.

1 Plaintiffs and Class Members prompt and accurate notice of the Data Breach.

2 10. Plaintiffs' and Class Members' identities are now at risk because of Defendants'
3 negligent conduct because the Private Information that Defendants collected and maintained
4 has been accessed and acquired by data thieves.

5 11. Armed with the Private Information accessed in the Data Breach, data thieves
6 can commit a variety of crimes including, *e.g.*, opening new financial accounts in Class
7 Members' names, taking out loans in Class Members' names, using Class Members'
8 information to obtain government benefits, filing fraudulent tax returns using Class Members'
9 information, obtaining driver's licenses in Class Members' names but with another person's
10 photograph, giving false information to police during an arrest, receiving health care services in
11 Class Members' names using their insurance, and committing health care insurance fraud.

12 12. As a result of the Data Breach, Plaintiffs and Class Members have been exposed
13 to a heightened and imminent risk of fraud and identity theft. Plaintiffs and Class Members
14 must now and in the future closely monitor their financial accounts to guard against identity
15 theft.

16 13. Plaintiffs and Class Members may also incur out-of-pocket costs, *e.g.*, for
17 purchasing credit monitoring services, credit freezes, credit reports, or other protective
18 measures to deter and detect identity theft.

19 14. Plaintiffs bring this class action lawsuit on behalf of all those similarly situated
20 to address Defendants' inadequate safeguarding of Class Members' Private Information that
21 they collected and maintained, and for failing to provide timely and adequate notice to
22 Plaintiffs and other Class Members that their information had been subject to the unauthorized
23 access by an unknown third party and precisely what specific type of information was accessed.
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27

1 ***The Data Breach***

2 36. On or about March 26, 2025, Defendants posted a Notification of Data Security
3 Incident on their website (the “Website Notice”), informing them that:

4 On or around January 25, 2025, Northwest Radiologists and
5 Mount Baker Imaging (“Northwest/MBI”), experienced a
6 network disruption that impacted certain systems and
7 immediately began investigating with the assistance of third-
8 party computer forensic specialists. The investigation determined
9 that certain data was accessed by an unauthorized party.
10 Therefore, we are currently reviewing the types of information
11 potentially impacted by this event; however, Northwest/MBI has
12 confirmed that a limited amount of protected health information
13 may have been impacted in connection with this event.

14 Although the review is ongoing, the types of information
15 generally might have included individuals’ first and last names in
16 combination with address information, telephone number, date of
17 birth, email address, Social Security number, driver’s license or
18 state identification card number, treatment or diagnosis
19 information, provider name, medical record number or patient
20 identification number, health insurance information, and/or
21 treatment cost information. Northwest/MBI has established a
22 dedicated call center to answer questions about the event and to
23 address related concerns.³

24 37. To date, Defendants have not provided individual notice to Class Members.

25 38. Omitted from the Website Notice were the identity of the cybercriminals who
26 perpetrated this Data Breach, the date(s) of the Data Breach, the details of the root cause of the
27 Data Breach, the vulnerabilities exploited, and the remedial measures undertaken to ensure
such a breach does not occur again. To date, these omitted details have not been explained or
clarified to Plaintiffs and Class Members, who retain a vested interest in ensuring that their
Private Information remains protected.

 39. This “disclosure” amounts to no real disclosure at all, as it fails to inform, with
any degree of specificity, Plaintiffs and Class Members of the Data Breach’s critical facts.

³ <https://mtbakerimaging.com/notification/>.

1 Without these details, Plaintiffs’ and Class Members’ ability to mitigate the harms resulting
2 from the Data Breach is severely diminished.

3 40. Despite Defendants’ intentional opacity about the root cause of this incident,
4 several facts may be gleaned from the Website Notice, including: a) that this Data Breach was
5 the work of cybercriminals; b) that the cybercriminals first infiltrated Defendants’ networks and
6 systems and accessed data; and c) that once inside Defendants’ networks and systems, the
7 cybercriminals targeted information including Plaintiffs’ and Class Members’ Private
8 Information.
9

10 41. In the context of data breach Website Notices of this type, Defendants’ use of the
11 phrase “might have included” is misleading legal language. Companies only issue
12 Website Notices because data breach notification laws require them to do so. Such
13 notices are made only where Defendants have a reasonable belief that their personal
14 information was accessed or acquired by an unauthorized individual or entity.
15 Defendants cannot hide behind legalese—by issuing a notice of data breach,
16 Defendants implicitly admit that they had a reasonable belief that unknown actors,
17 aka cybercriminals, accessed or acquired Plaintiffs’ and Class Members’ names,
18 Social Security numbers, PHI, and other sensitive information.
19

20 42. Moreover, in their Website Notice, Defendants failed to (a) specify whether they
21 undertook any efforts to find out if Class Members whose data was accessed and acquired in
22 the Data Breach had suffered misuse of their data; (b) indicate that Defendants were interested
23 in hearing about misuse of their data; or (c) set up a mechanism for Class Members to report
24 misuse of their data.
25

26 43. Defendants had obligations created by the FTC Act, HIPAA, contract, common
27

1 law, and industry standards to keep Plaintiffs’ and Class Members’ Private Information
2 confidential and to protect it from unauthorized access and disclosure.

3 44. Because Defendants did not use reasonable security procedures and practices
4 appropriate to the nature of the sensitive information they were maintaining for Plaintiffs and
5 Class Members, such as encrypting the information or deleting it when it is no longer needed,
6 Defendants allowed the exposure of Private Information.
7

8 45. The attacker accessed files containing Plaintiffs’ and Class Members’
9 unencrypted Private Information.

10 ***Data Breaches Are Preventable***

11
12 46. Defendants did not use reasonable security procedures and practices appropriate
13 to the nature of the sensitive information they were maintaining for Plaintiffs and Class
14 Members, such as encrypting the information or deleting it when it is no longer needed, thereby
15 causing the exposure of Private Information,

16 47. Defendants could have prevented this Data Breach by, among other things,
17 properly encrypting or otherwise protecting their equipment and computer files containing
18 Private Information.
19

20 48. As explained by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, “[p]revention is the most
21 effective defense against ransomware and it is critical to take precautions for protection.”⁴

22 49. To prevent and detect cyber-attacks and/or ransomware attacks, Defendant could
23 and should have implemented the following measures recommended by the United States
24 Government:
25

26 _____
27 ⁴ How to Protect Your Networks from RANSOMWARE at 3, available at
<https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/ransomware-prevention-and-response-for-cisos.pdf/view>.

- 1 • Implement an awareness and training program to ensure targeted end users are
2 aware of the threat of ransomware and how it is delivered.
- 3 • Enable strong spam filters to prevent phishing emails from reaching the end users
4 and authenticate inbound email using technologies like Sender Policy Framework
5 (SPF), Domain Message Authentication Reporting and Conformance (DMARC),
6 and DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM) to prevent email spoofing.
- 7 • Scan all incoming and outgoing emails to detect threats and filter executable files
8 from reaching end users.
- 9 • Configure firewalls to block access to known malicious IP addresses.
- 10 • Patch operating systems, software, and firmware on devices, optimally with a
11 centralized patch management system.
- 12 • Set anti-virus and anti-malware programs to conduct regular scans automatically.
- 13 • Manage the use of privileged accounts based on the principle of least privilege: no
14 users should be assigned administrative access unless absolutely needed; and those
15 with a need for administrator accounts should only use them when necessary.
- 16 • Configure access controls—including file, directory, and network share
17 permissions—with least privilege in mind. If a user only needs to read specific files,
18 the user should not have write access to those files, directories, or shares.
- 19 • Disable macro scripts from office files transmitted via email. Consider using Office
20 Viewer software to open Microsoft Office files transmitted via email instead of full
21 office suite applications.
- 22 • Implement Software Restriction Policies (SRP) or other controls to prevent
23 programs from executing from common ransomware locations, such as temporary
24 folders supporting popular Internet browsers or compression/decompression
25 programs, including the AppData/LocalAppData folder.
- 26 • Consider disabling Remote Desktop protocol (RDP) if it is not being used.
- 27 • Use application whitelisting, which only allows systems to execute programs known
and permitted by security policy.
- Execute operating system environments or specific programs in a virtualized
environment.
- Categorize data based on organizational value and implement physical and logical
separation of networks and data for different organizational units.⁵

⁵ *Id.* at 3–4.

1 50. To prevent and detect cyber-attacks or ransomware attacks, Defendants could
2 and should have implemented the following measures recommended by the Microsoft Threat
3 Protection Intelligence Team:

4 **Secure Internet-Facing Assets**

- 5
- 6 • Apply latest security updates;
 - 7 • Use threat and vulnerability management; and
 - 8 • Perform regular audit; remove privileged credentials;

9 **Thoroughly investigate and remediate alerts**

- 10 • Prioritize and treat commodity malware infections as potential full compromise;

11 **Include IT Pros in security discussions**

- 12 • Ensure collaboration among [security operations], [security admins], and
13 [information technology] admins by configuring servers and other endpoints
14 securely;

15 **Build credential hygiene**

- 16 • Use [multifactor authentication] or [network level authentication] and use strong,
17 randomized, just-in-time local admin passwords;

18 **Apply principle of least-privilege**

- 19 • Monitor for adversarial activities;
- 20 • Hunt for brute force attempts;
- 21 • Monitor for cleanup of Event Logs; and
- 22 • Analyze logon events;

23 **Harden infrastructure**

- 24 • Use Windows Defender Firewall;
- 25 • Enable tamper protection;
- 26 • Enable cloud-delivered protection; and
- 27 • Turn on attack surface reduction rules and [Antimalware Scan Interface] for
Office[Visual Basic for Applications].⁶

⁶ See *Human-operated ransomware attacks: A preventable disaster* (Mar 5, 2020), available at <https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/03/05/human-operated-ransomware-attacks-a-preventable-disaster/>.

1 51. Given that Defendants were storing the Private Information of their current and
2 former patients, Defendants could and should have implemented all of the above measures to
3 prevent and detect cyberattacks.

4 52. The occurrence of the Data Breach indicates that Defendants failed to
5 adequately implement one or more of the above measures to prevent cyberattacks, resulting in
6 the Data Breach and data thieves accessing the Private Information of Plaintiffs and Class
7 Members.
8

9 ***Defendants Acquire, Collect, and Store Patients' Private Information***

10 53. Defendants acquire, collect, and store a massive amount of Private Information
11 of their current and former patients.

12 54. As a condition of becoming a patient of Defendants, Defendants require that
13 patients entrust them with highly sensitive personal information.
14

15 55. By obtaining, collecting, and using Plaintiffs' and Class Members' Private
16 Information, Defendants assumed legal and equitable duties and knew or should have known
17 that they were responsible for protecting Plaintiffs' and Class Members' Private Information
18 from disclosure.
19

20 56. Plaintiffs and Class Members have taken reasonable steps to maintain the
21 confidentiality of their Private Information and would not have entrusted it to Defendants
22 absent a promise to safeguard that information.

23 57. Upon information and belief, Defendants promised in privacy policies and other
24 legally required disclosures to treat the Private Information they collected from patients,
25 including that of Plaintiffs, as confidential and to provide adequate security for it.
26
27

1 58. Plaintiffs and the Class Members relied on Defendants to keep their Private
2 Information confidential and securely maintained, to use this information for business purposes
3 only, and to make only authorized disclosures of this information.
4

5 ***Defendants Knew, or Should Have Known, of the Risk Because Healthcare Entities
in Possession of Private Information Are Particularly Susceptible to Cyber Attacks***

6 59. Defendants’ data security obligations were particularly important given the
7 substantial increase in cyber-attacks and/or data breaches targeting healthcare entities that
8 collect and store Private Information, like Defendants, preceding the date of the breach.
9

10 60. Data breaches, including those perpetrated against healthcare entities that store
11 Private Information in their systems, have become widespread.

12 61. In the third quarter of the 2023 fiscal year alone, 7,333 organizations
13 experienced data breaches, resulting in 66,658,764 individuals’ personal information being
14 compromised.⁷

15 62. In light of recent high profile cybersecurity incidents at other healthcare partner
16 and provider companies, including HCA Healthcare (11 million patients, July 2023), Managed
17 Care of North America (8 million patients, March 2023), PharMerica Corporation (5 million
18 patients, March 2023), HealthEC LLC (4 million patients, July 2023), ESO Solutions, Inc. (2.7
19 million patients, September 2023), Prospect Medical Holdings, Inc. (1.3 million patients, July-
20 August 2023), Defendants knew or should have known that their electronic records would be
21 targeted by cybercriminals.
22

23 63. Indeed, cyber-attacks, such as the one experienced by Defendants, have become
24 so notorious that the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) and U.S. Secret Service have
25 issued a warning to potential targets so they are aware of, and prepared for, a potential attack.
26

27 ⁷ See <https://www.idtheftcenter.org/publication/q3-data-breach-2023-analysis/>.

1 As one report explained, smaller entities that store Private Information are “attractive to
2 ransomware criminals . . . because they often have lesser IT defenses and a high incentive to
3 regain access to their data quickly.”⁸

4 64. Additionally, as companies became more dependent on computer systems to run
5 their business,⁹ *e.g.*, working remotely as a result of the Covid-19 pandemic, and the Internet of
6 Things (“IoT”), the danger posed by cybercriminals is magnified, thereby highlighting the need
7 for adequate administrative, physical, and technical safeguards.¹⁰

9 65. Defendants knew and understood unprotected or exposed Private Information in
10 the custody of healthcare entities, like Defendants, is valuable and highly sought after by
11 nefarious third parties seeking to illegally monetize that Private Information through
12 unauthorized access.

13 66. At all relevant times, Defendants knew, or reasonably should have known, of the
14 importance of safeguarding the Private Information of Plaintiffs and Class Members and of the
15 foreseeable consequences that would occur if Defendants’ data security system was breached,
16 including, specifically, the significant costs that would be imposed on Plaintiffs and Class
17 Members as a result of a breach.

19 67. Plaintiffs and Class Members now face years of constant surveillance of their
20 financial and personal records, monitoring, and loss of rights. The Class is incurring and will
21 continue to incur such damages in addition to any fraudulent use of their Private Information.
22

23
24 _____
25 ⁸ https://www.law360.com/patientprotection/articles/1220974/fbi-secret-service-warn-of-targeted-ransomware?nl_pk=3ed44a08-fcc2-4b6c-89f0-aa0155a8bb51&utm_source=newsletter&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=patientprotection.

26 ⁹ <https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/notes/feds-notes/implications-of-cyber-risk-for-financial-stability-20220512.html>.
27

1 68. The injuries to Plaintiffs and Class Members were directly and proximately
2 caused by Defendants’ failure to implement or maintain adequate data security measures for the
3 Private Information of Plaintiffs and Class Members.

4 69. The ramifications of Defendants’ failure to secure the Private Information of
5 Plaintiffs and Class Members are long lasting and severe. Once Private Information is stolen—
6 particularly Social Security numbers and PHI—fraudulent use of that information and damage
7 to victims may continue for years.
8

9 70. As healthcare entities in custody of the Private Information of patients,
10 Defendants knew, or should have known, the importance of safeguarding Private Information
11 entrusted to them by Plaintiffs and Class Members, and of the foreseeable consequences if
12 those data security systems were breached. This includes the significant costs imposed on
13 Plaintiffs and Class Members as a result of a breach. Defendants failed, however, to take
14 adequate cybersecurity measures to prevent the Data Breach.
15

16 ***Value of Private Information***

17 71. The Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) defines identity theft as “a fraud
18 committed or attempted using the identifying information of another person without
19 authority.”¹¹ The FTC describes “identifying information” as “any name or number that may be
20 used, alone or in conjunction with any other information, to identify a specific person,”
21 including, among other things, “[n]ame, Social Security number, date of birth, official State or
22 government issued driver’s license or identification number, alien registration number,
23
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26 ¹⁰ [https://www.picussecurity.com/key-threats-and-cyber-risks-facing-financial-services-and-
27 banking-firms-in-2022](https://www.picussecurity.com/key-threats-and-cyber-risks-facing-financial-services-and-banking-firms-in-2022).

¹¹ 17 C.F.R. § 248.201 (2013).

1 government passport number, employer or taxpayer identification number.”¹²

2 72. The PII of individuals remains of high value to criminals, as evidenced by the
3 prices they will pay through the Dark Web. Numerous sources cite Dark Web pricing for stolen
4 identity credentials.¹³

5 73. For example, Private Information can be sold at a price ranging from \$40 to
6 \$200.¹⁴ Criminals can also purchase access to entire company data breaches from \$900 to
7 \$4,500.¹⁵

8 74. Moreover, Social Security numbers, which were compromised for some Class
9 Members in the Data Breach, are among the worst kind of Private Information to have stolen
10 because they may be put to a variety of fraudulent uses and are difficult for an individual to
11 change.
12

13 75. According to the Social Security Administration, each time an individual’s
14 Social Security number is compromised, “the potential for a thief to illegitimately gain access
15 to bank accounts, credit cards, driving records, tax and employment histories and other private
16 information increases.”¹⁶ Moreover, “[b]ecause many organizations still use SSNs as the
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19

20 ¹² *Id.*

21 ¹³ *Your personal data is for sale on the Dark Web. Here’s how much it costs*, Digital Trends,
22 Oct. 16, 2019, available at <https://www.digitaltrends.com/computing/personal-data-sold-on-the-dark-web-how-much-it-costs/>.

23 ¹⁴ *Here’s How Much Your Personal Information Is Selling for on the Dark Web*, Experian, Dec.
24 6, 2017, available at <https://www.experian.com/blogs/ask-experian/heres-how-much-your-personal-information-is-selling-for-on-the-dark-web/>.

25 ¹⁵ *In the Dark*, VPNOverview, 2019, available at
<https://vpnoverview.com/privacy/anonymous-browsing/in-the-dark/>.

26 ¹⁶ *See*
27 <https://www.ssa.gov/phila/ProtectingSSNs.htm#:~:text=An%20organization's%20collection%20and%20use,and%20other%20private%20information%20increases.>

1 primary identifier, exposure to identity theft and fraud remains.”¹⁷

2 76. The Social Security Administration stresses that the loss of an individual’s
3 Social Security number can lead to identity theft and extensive financial fraud:
4

5 A dishonest person who has your Social Security number
6 can use it to get other personal information about you. Identity
7 thieves can use your number and your good credit to apply for
8 more credit in your name. Then, they use the credit cards and
9 don’t pay the bills, it damages your credit. You may not find out
10 that someone is using your number until you’re turned down for
11 credit, or you begin to get calls from unknown creditors
12 demanding payment for items you never bought. Someone
13 illegally using your Social Security number and assuming your
14 identity can cause a lot of problems.¹⁸

15 77. In fact, “[a] stolen Social Security number is one of the leading causes of
16 identity theft and can threaten your financial health.”¹⁹ “Someone who has your SSN can use it
17 to impersonate you, obtain credit and open bank accounts, apply for jobs, steal your tax
18 refunds, get medical treatment, and steal your government benefits.”²⁰
19

20 78. It is no easy task to change or cancel a stolen Social Security number. An
21 individual cannot obtain a new Social Security number without significant paperwork and
22 evidence of actual misuse. In other words, preventive action to defend against the possibility of
23 misuse of a Social Security number is not permitted; an individual must show evidence of
24 actual, ongoing fraud activity to obtain a new number.
25

26 79. Even then, a new Social Security number may not be effective. According to
27

28 ¹⁷ *Id.*

29 ¹⁸ Social Security Administration, *Identity Theft and Your Social Security Number*, available at:
30 <https://www.ssa.gov/pubs/EN-05-10064.pdf>.

31 ¹⁹ See <https://www.equifax.com/personal/education/identity-theft/articles/-/learn/social-security-number-identity-theft/>.

32 ²⁰ See <https://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/ssn.asp>.

1 Julie Ferguson of the Identity Theft Resource Center, “[t]he credit bureaus and banks are able
2 to link the new number very quickly to the old number, so all of that old bad information is
3 quickly inherited into the new Social Security number.”²¹

4 80. For these reasons, some courts have referred to Social Security numbers as the
5 “gold standard” for identity theft. *Portier v. NEO Tech. Sols.*, No. 3:17-CV-30111, 2019 WL
6 7946103, at *12 (D. Mass. Dec. 31, 2019) (“Because Social Security numbers are the gold
7 standard for identity theft, their theft is significant Access to Social Security numbers
8 causes long-lasting jeopardy because the Social Security Administration does not normally
9 replace Social Security numbers.”), *report and recommendation adopted*, No. 3:17-CV-30111,
10 2020 WL 877035 (D. Mass. Jan. 30, 2020); *see also McFarlane v. Altice USA, Inc.*, 2021 WL
11 860584, at *4 (citations omitted) (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2021) (the court noted that Plaintiffs’
12 Social Security numbers are: arguably “the most dangerous type of personal information in the
13 hands of identity thieves” because it is immutable and can be used to “impersonat[e] [the
14 victim] to get medical services, government benefits, . . . tax refunds, [and] employment.” . . .
15 Unlike a credit card number, which can be changed to eliminate the risk of harm following a
16 data breach, “[a] social security number derives its value in that it is immutable,” and when it is
17 stolen it can “forever be wielded to identify [the victim] and target his in fraudulent schemes
18 and identity theft attacks.”).

19 81. Similarly, the California state government warns patients that: “[o]riginally,
20 your Social Security number (SSN) was a way for the government to track your earnings and
21 pay you retirement benefits. But over the years, it has become much more than that. It is the
22

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24
25
26 ²¹ Bryan Naylor, *Victims of Social Security Number Theft Find It’s Hard to Bounce Back*, NPR
27 (Feb. 9, 2015), available at <http://www.npr.org/2015/02/09/384875839/data-stolen-by-anthem-s-hackers-has-millionsworrying-about-identity-theft>.

1 key to a lot of your personal information. With your name and SSN, an identity thief could
2 open new credit and bank accounts, rent an apartment, or even get a job.”²²

3 82. Theft of PHI is also gravely serious: “[a] thief may use your name or health
4 insurance numbers to see a doctor, get prescription drugs, file claims with your insurance
5 provider, or get other care. If the thief’s health information is mixed with yours, your treatment,
6 insurance and payment records, and credit report may be affected.”²³

7
8 83. The greater efficiency of electronic health records brings the risk of privacy
9 breaches. These electronic health records contain a lot of sensitive information (e.g., patient
10 data, patient diagnosis, lab results, medications, prescriptions, treatment plans, etc.) that is
11 valuable to cybercriminals. One patient’s complete record can be sold for hundreds of dollars
12 on the Dark Web. As such, PHI/PII is a valuable commodity for which a “cyber black market”
13 exists where criminals openly post on several underground internet websites stolen payment
14 card numbers, Social Security numbers, and other personal information. Unsurprisingly, the
15 pharmaceutical industry is at high risk and is acutely affected by cyberattacks, like the Data
16 Breach here.

17
18 84. Between 2005 and 2019, at least 249 million people were affected by healthcare
19 data breaches.²⁴ Indeed, during 2019 alone, over 41 million healthcare records were exposed,
20 stolen, or unlawfully disclosed in 505 data breaches.²⁵ In short, these sorts of data breaches are
21 increasingly common, especially among healthcare systems, which account for 30.03 percent of
22

23
24 ²² See <https://oag.ca.gov/idtheft/facts/your-ssn>.

25 ²³ *Medical I.D. Theft*, EFraudPrevention,
<https://efraudprevention.net/home/education/?a=187#:~:text=A%20thief%20may%20use%20your,credit%20report%20may%20be%20affected>.

26 ²⁴ <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7349636/#B5-healthcare-08-00133/>.

27 ²⁵ <https://www.hipaajournal.com/december-2019-healthcare-data-breach-report/>.

1 overall health data breaches, according to cybersecurity firm Tenable.²⁶

2 85. According to account monitoring company LogDog, medical data sells for \$50
3 and up on the Dark Web.²⁷

4 86. “Medical identity theft is a growing and dangerous crime that leaves its victims
5 with little to no recourse for recovery,” reported Pam Dixon, executive director of World
6 Privacy Forum. “Victims often experience financial repercussions and worse yet, they
7 frequently discover erroneous information has been added to their personal medical files due to
8 the thief’s activities.”²⁸

9
10 87. A study by Experian found that the average cost of medical identity theft is
11 “about \$20,000” per incident and that most victims of medical identity theft were forced to pay
12 out-of-pocket costs for healthcare they did not receive to restore coverage.²⁹ Almost half of
13 medical identity theft victims lose their healthcare coverage as a result of the incident, while
14 nearly one-third of medical identity theft victims saw their insurance premiums rise, and 40
15 percent were never able to resolve their identity theft at all.³⁰

16
17 88. This data demands a much higher price on the black market. Martin Walter,
18 senior director at cybersecurity firm RedSeal, explained, “Compared to credit card information,
19 personally identifiable information and Social Security numbers are worth more than 10x on
20

21
22 _____
23 ²⁶ <https://www.tenable.com/blog/healthcare-security-ransomware-plays-a-prominent-role-incovid-19-era-breaches/>.

24 ²⁷ Lisa Vaas, *Ransomware Attacks Paralyze, and Sometimes Crush, Hospitals*, Naked Security
(Oct. 3, 2019), <https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2019/10/03/ransomware-attacks-paralyze-and-sometimes-crush-hospitals/#content>.

25 ²⁸ Michael Ollove, “The Rise of Medical Identity Theft in Healthcare,” Kaiser Health News,
26 Feb. 7, 2014, <https://khn.org/news/rise-of-identity-theft/>.

27 ²⁹ See Elinor Mills, “Study: Medical Identity Theft is Costly for Victims,” CNET (Mar. 3,
2010), <https://www.cnet.com/news/study-medical-identity-theft-is-costly-for-victims/>.

1 the black market.”³¹

2 89. Based on the foregoing, the information compromised in the Data Breach is
3 significantly more valuable than the loss of, for example, credit card information in a retailer
4 data breach because, there, victims can cancel or close credit and debit card accounts. The
5 information compromised in this Data Breach is impossible to “close” and difficult, if not
6 impossible, to change—Social Security numbers, PHI, dates of birth, and names.
7

8 90. Among other forms of fraud, identity thieves may obtain driver’s licenses,
9 government benefits, medical services, and housing or even give false information to police.

10 91. The fraudulent activity resulting from the Data Breach may not come to light for
11 years. There may be a time lag between when harm occurs versus when it is discovered, and
12 also between when Private Information is stolen and when it is used. According to the U.S.
13 Government Accountability Office (“GAO”), which conducted a study regarding data
14 breaches:
15

16 [L]aw enforcement officials told us that in some cases, stolen
17 data may be held for up to a year or more before being used to
18 commit identity theft. Further, once stolen data have been sold or
19 posted on the Web, fraudulent use of that information may
20 continue for years. As a result, studies that attempt to measure the
21 harm resulting from data breaches cannot necessarily rule out all
22 future harm.³²

23 92. Plaintiffs and Class Members now face years of constant surveillance of their
24 financial and personal records, monitoring, and loss of rights. The Class is incurring and will
25

26 ³⁰ *Id.*; see also *Healthcare Data Breach: What to Know About them and What to Do After One*,
27 EXPERIAN, <https://www.experian.com/blogs/ask-experian/healthcare-data-breach-what-to-know-about-them-and-what-to-do-after-one/>.

28 ³¹ Tim Greene, *Anthem Hack: Personal Data Stolen Sells for 10x Price of Stolen Credit Card*
29 *Numbers*, IT World, (Feb. 6, 2015), available at
30 <https://www.networkworld.com/article/2880366/anthem-hack-personal-data-stolen-sells-for-10x-price-of-stolen-credit-card-numbers.html> .

1 continue to incur such damages in addition to any fraudulent use of their Private Information.

2 ***Defendants Failed to Comply with FTC Guidelines***

3
4 93. The Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) has promulgated numerous guides for
5 businesses which highlight the importance of implementing reasonable data security practices.
6 According to the FTC, the need for data security should be factored into all business decision-
7 making.

8 94. In 2016, the FTC updated its publication, *Protecting Personal Information: A*
9 *Guide for Business*, which established cyber-security guidelines for businesses. These
10 guidelines note that businesses should protect the personal patient information that they keep;
11 properly dispose of personal information that is no longer needed; encrypt information stored
12 on computer networks; understand their network’s vulnerabilities; and implement policies to
13 correct any security problems.³³

14
15 95. The guidelines also recommend that businesses use an intrusion detection
16 system to expose a breach as soon as it occurs; monitor all incoming traffic for activity
17 indicating someone is attempting to hack the system; watch for large amounts of data being
18 transmitted from the system; and have a response plan ready in the event of a breach.³⁴

19
20 96. The FTC further recommends that companies not maintain Private Information
21 longer than is needed for authorization of a transaction; limit access to sensitive data; require
22 complex passwords to be used on networks; use industry-tested methods for security; monitor
23

24 ³² *Report to Congressional Requesters*, GAO, at 29 (June 2007), available at
25 <https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-07-737.pdf>.

26 ³³ *Protecting Personal Information: A Guide for Business*, Federal Trade Commission (2016).
27 Available at https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/plain-language/pdf-0136_proteting-personal-information.pdf.

³⁴ *Id.*

1 for suspicious activity on the network; and verify that third-party service providers have
2 implemented reasonable security measures.

3 97. The FTC has brought enforcement actions against businesses for failing to
4 adequately and reasonably protect patient data, treating the failure to employ reasonable and
5 appropriate measures to protect against unauthorized access to confidential patient data as an
6 unfair act or practice prohibited by Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (“FTCA”),
7 15 U.S.C. § 45. Orders resulting from these actions further clarify the measures businesses
8 must take to meet their data security obligations.
9

10 98. These FTC enforcement actions include actions against healthcare providers like
11 Defendants. *See, e.g., In the Matter of LabMd, Inc., A Corp*, 2016-2 Trade Cas. (Henry Ford) ¶
12 79708, 2016 WL 4128215, at *32 (MSNET July 28, 2016) (“[T]he Commission concludes that
13 LabMD’s data security practices were unreasonable and constitute an unfair act or practice in
14 violation of Section 5 of the FTC Act.”).
15

16 99. Section 5 of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45, prohibits “unfair . . . practices in or
17 affecting commerce,” including, as interpreted and enforced by the FTC, the unfair act or
18 practice by businesses, such as Defendants, of failing to use reasonable measures to protect
19 Private Information. The FTC publications and orders described above also form part of the
20 basis of Defendants’ duty in this regard.
21

22 100. Defendants failed to properly implement basic data security practices.

23 101. Defendants’ failure to employ reasonable and appropriate measures to protect
24 against unauthorized access to the Private Information of their patients or to comply with
25 applicable industry standards constitutes an unfair act or practice prohibited by Section 5 of the
26 FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45.
27

1 102. Upon information and belief, Defendants were at all times fully aware of their
2 obligation to protect the Private Information of patients. Defendants were also aware of the
3 significant repercussions that would result from their failure to do so. Accordingly, Defendants’
4 conduct was particularly unreasonable given the nature and amount of Private Information they
5 obtained and stored and the foreseeable consequences of the immense damages that would
6 result to Plaintiffs and the Class.
7

8 ***Defendants Failed to Comply with HIPAA Guidelines***

9 103. Defendants are covered entities under HIPAA (45 C.F.R. § 160.102) and are
10 required to comply with the HIPAA Privacy Rule and Security Rule, 45 C.F.R. Part 160 and
11 Part 164, Subparts A and E (“Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health
12 Information”), and Security Rule (“Security Standards for the Protection of Electronic
13 Protected Health Information”), 45 C.F.R. Part 160 and Part 164, Subparts A and C.
14

15 104. Defendants are subject to the rules and regulations for safeguarding electronic
16 forms of medical information pursuant to the Health Information Technology Act
17 (“HITECH”).³⁵ See 42 U.S.C. §17921, 45 C.F.R. § 160.103.
18

19 105. HIPAA’s Privacy Rule or *Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable*
20 *Health Information* establishes national standards for the protection of health information.

21 106. HIPAA’s Privacy Rule or *Security Standards for the Protection of Electronic*
22 *Protected Health Information* establishes a national set of security standards for protecting
23 health information that is kept or transferred in electronic form.

24 107. HIPAA requires “compl[iance] with the applicable standards, implementation
25 specifications, and requirements” of HIPAA “with respect to electronic protected health
26
27

1 information.” 45 C.F.R. § 164.302.

2 108. “Electronic protected health information” is “individually identifiable health
3 information . . . that is (i) transmitted by electronic media; maintained in electronic media.” 45
4 C.F.R. § 160.103.

5 109. HIPAA’s Security Rule requires Defendants to do the following:

- 6 a. Ensure the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of all electronic
7 protected health information the covered entity or business associate
8 creates, receives, maintains, or transmits;
- 9 b. Protect against any reasonably anticipated threats or hazards to the
10 security or integrity of such information;
- 11 c. Protect against any reasonably anticipated uses or disclosures of such
12 information that are not permitted; and
- 13 d. Ensure compliance by their workforce.

14
15 110. HIPAA also requires Defendants to “review and modify the security measures
16 implemented . . . as needed to continue provision of reasonable and appropriate protection of
17 electronic protected health information.” 45 C.F.R. § 164.306(e). Additionally, Defendants are
18 required under HIPAA to “[i]mplement technical policies and procedures for electronic
19 information systems that maintain electronic protected health information to allow access only
20 to those persons or software programs that have been granted access rights.” 45 C.F.R.
21 § 164.312(a)(1).

22
23 111. HIPAA and HITECH also obligated Defendants to implement policies and
24 procedures to prevent, detect, contain, and correct security violations, and to protect against
25

26
27 ³⁵ HIPAA and HITECH work in tandem to provide guidelines and rules for maintaining
protected health information. HITECH references and incorporates HIPAA.

1 uses or disclosures of electronic protected health information that are reasonably anticipated but
2 not permitted by the privacy rules. *See* 45 C.F.R. § 164.306(a)(1) and § 164.306(a)(3); *see also*
3 42 U.S.C. §17902.

4 112. The HIPAA Breach Notification Rule, 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.400-414, also requires
5 Defendants to provide notice of the Data Breach to each affected individual “without
6 unreasonable delay and *in no case later than 60 days following discovery of the breach.*”³⁶

7
8 113. HIPAA requires a covered entity to have and apply appropriate sanctions against
9 personnel of its workforce who fail to comply with the privacy policies and procedures of the
10 covered entity or the requirements of 45 C.F.R. Part 164, Subparts D or E. *See* 45 C.F.R.
11 § 164.530(e).

12 114. HIPAA requires a covered entity to mitigate, to the extent practicable, any
13 harmful effect that is known to the covered entity of a use or disclosure of protected health
14 information in violation of its policies and procedures or the requirements of 45 C.F.R. Part
15 164, Subpart E by the covered entity or its business associate. *See* 45 C.F.R. § 164.530(f).

16
17 115. HIPAA also requires the Office of Civil Rights (“OCR”), within the Department
18 of Health and Human Services (“HHS”), to issue annual guidance documents on the provisions
19 in the HIPAA Security Rule. *See* 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.302-164.318. For example, “HHS has
20 developed guidance and tools to assist HIPAA covered entities in identifying and implementing
21 the most cost effective and appropriate administrative, physical, and technical safeguards to
22 protect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of e-PHI and comply with the risk analysis
23

24
25
26
27 ³⁶ *Breach Notification Rule*, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Services,
<https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/breach-notification/index.html> (emphasis added).

1 requirements of the Security Rule.”³⁷ The list of resources includes a link to guidelines set by
2 the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), which OCR says “represent the
3 industry standard for good business practices with respect to standards for securing e-PHI.”³⁸

4 116. Defendants’ Data Breach resulted from a combination of insufficiencies that
5 demonstrate Defendants failed to comply with safeguards mandated by HIPAA regulations.
6

7 ***Defendants Failed to Comply with Industry Standards***

8 117. As noted above, experts studying cyber security routinely identify healthcare
9 entities in possession of Private Information as being particularly vulnerable to cyberattacks
10 because of the value of the Private Information which they collect and maintain.

11 118. Several best practices have been identified that, at a minimum, should be
12 implemented by healthcare entities in possession of Private Information, like Defendants.
13 Those practices include, but are not limited to, educating all employees; employing strong
14 passwords; implementing multi-layer security, including firewalls, anti-virus, and anti-malware
15 software; encrypting data to make it unreadable without a key; requiring multi-factor
16 authentication; backing up data and limiting which employees can access sensitive data.
17 Defendants failed to follow all of these industry best practices.
18

19 119. Other best cybersecurity practices that are standard for healthcare entities
20 include installing appropriate malware detection software; monitoring and limiting the network
21 ports; protecting web browsers and email management systems; setting up network systems
22 such as firewalls, switches and routers; monitoring and protecting physical security systems;
23 safeguarding all possible communication systems; and training staff regarding critical points.
24
25

26 _____
27 ³⁷ HHS, *Security Rule Guidance Material*, <http://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/security/guidance/index.html>.

1 Defendants failed to follow all these cybersecurity best practices, including failure to train staff.

2 120. Defendants failed to meet the minimum standards of any of the following
3 frameworks: the NIST Cybersecurity Framework Version 2.0 (including without limitation
4 PR.AA-01, PR.AA-02, PR.AA-03, PR.AA-04, PR.AA-05, PR.AT-01, PR.DS-01, PR.DS-02,
5 PR.DS-10, PR.PS-01, PR.PS-02, PR.PS-05, PR.IR-01, DE.CM-01, DE.CM-03, DE.CM-06,
6 DE.CM-09, and RS.CO-04), and the Center for Internet Security’s Critical Security Controls
7 (CIS CSC), which are all established standards in reasonable cybersecurity readiness.
8

9 121. These foregoing frameworks are existing and applicable industry standards for
10 healthcare entities, and upon information and belief, Defendants failed to comply with at least
11 one—or all—of these accepted standards, thereby opening the door to the threat actor and
12 causing the Data Breach.
13

14 ***Common Injuries & Damages***

15 122. As a result of Defendants’ ineffective and inadequate data security practices, the
16 risk of identity theft to the Plaintiffs and Class Members has materialized and is imminent, and
17 Plaintiffs and Class Members have all sustained actual injuries and damages, including: (i)
18 invasion of privacy; (ii) theft of their Private Information; (iii) lost or diminished value of
19 Private Information; (iv) lost time and opportunity costs associated with attempting to mitigate
20 the actual consequences of the Data Breach; (v) loss of benefit of the bargain; (vi) nominal
21 damages; and (vii) the continued and certainly increased risk to their Private Information,
22 which: (a) remains unencrypted and available for unauthorized third parties to access and
23 abuse; and (b) remains backed up in Defendants’ possession and is subject to further
24
25
26

27 ³⁸ HHS, *Guidance on Risk Analysis*, <https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/security/guidance/guidance-risk-analysis/index.html>.

1 unauthorized disclosures so long as Defendants fail to undertake appropriate and adequate
2 measures to protect the Private Information.

3 ***Data Breaches Increase Victims' Risk of Identity Theft***
4

5 123. The unencrypted Private Information of Class Members will very likely end up
6 for sale on the Dark Web, as that is the modus operandi of hackers.

7 124. Unencrypted Private Information may also fall into the hands of companies that
8 will use the detailed Private Information for targeted marketing without the approval of
9 Plaintiffs and Class Members. Simply put, unauthorized individuals can easily access the
10 Private Information of Plaintiffs and Class Members.

11 125. The link between a data breach and the risk of identity theft is simple and well
12 established. Criminals acquire and steal Private Information to monetize the information.
13 Criminals monetize the data by selling the stolen information on the black market to other
14 criminals who then utilize the information to commit a variety of identity theft related crimes
15 discussed below.

16 126. Plaintiffs' and Class Members' Private Information is of great value to hackers
17 and cyber criminals, and the data stolen in the Data Breach has been used and will continue to
18 be used in a variety of sordid ways for criminals to exploit Plaintiffs and Class Members and to
19 profit off their misfortune.
20

21 127. Due to the risk of one's Social Security number being exposed, state legislatures
22 have passed laws in recognition of the risk: "[t]he social security number can be used as a tool
23 to perpetuate fraud against a person and to acquire sensitive personal, financial, medical, and
24 familial information, the release of which could cause great financial or personal harm to an
25 individual. While the social security number was intended to be used solely for the
26
27

1 administration of the federal Social Security System, over time this unique numeric identifier
2 has been used extensively for identity verification purposes.”³⁹

3 128. Moreover, “SSNs have been central to the American identity infrastructure for
4 years, being used as a key identifier. . . . U.S. banking processes have also had SSNs baked into
5 their identification process for years. In fact, SSNs have been the gold standard for identifying
6 and verifying the credit history of prospective patients.”⁴⁰

7
8 129. “Despite the risk of fraud associated with the theft of Social Security numbers,
9 just five of the nation’s largest twenty-five banks have stopped using the numbers to verify a
10 patient’s identity after the initial account setup.”⁴¹ Accordingly, since Social Security numbers
11 are frequently used to verify an individual’s identity after logging onto an account or
12 attempting a transaction, “[h]aving access to your Social Security number may be enough to
13 help a thief steal money from your bank account”⁴²

14
15 130. One such example of criminals piecing together bits and pieces of compromised
16 Private Information for profit is the development of “Fullz” packages.⁴³

17
18 ³⁹ See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 132-1.10(1).

19 ⁴⁰ See <https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/banks-need-to-stop-relying-on-social-security-numbers>.

20 ⁴¹ See <https://archive.nytimes.com/bucks.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/03/20/just-5-banks-prohibit-use-of-social-security-numbers/>.

21 ⁴² See <https://www.credit.com/blog/5-things-an-identity-thief-can-do-with-your-social-security-number-108597/>.

22 ⁴³ “Fullz” is fraudster speak for data that includes the information of the victim, including, but
23 not limited to, the name, address, credit card information, social security number, date of birth,
24 and more. As a rule of thumb, the more information you have on a victim, the more money that
25 can be made off of those credentials. Fullz are usually pricier than standard credit card
26 credentials, commanding up to \$100 per record (or more) on the Dark Web. Fullz can be
27 cashed out (turning credentials into money) in various ways, including performing bank
transactions over the phone with the required authentication details in-hand. Even “dead Fullz,”
which are Fullz credentials associated with credit cards that are no longer valid, can still be
used for numerous purposes, including tax refund scams, ordering credit cards on behalf of the
victim, or opening a “mule account” (an account that will accept a fraudulent money transfer
from a compromised account) without the victim’s knowledge. See, e.g., Brian Krebs, *Medical*

1 131. With “Fullz” packages, cyber-criminals can cross-reference two sources of
2 Private Information to marry unregulated data available elsewhere to criminally stolen data
3 with an astonishingly complete scope and degree of accuracy in order to assemble complete
4 dossiers on individuals.

5 132. The development of “Fullz” packages means here that the stolen Private
6 Information from the Data Breach can easily be used to link and identify it to Plaintiff’s and
7 Class Members’ phone numbers, email addresses, and other unregulated sources and
8 identifiers. In other words, even if certain information such as emails, phone numbers, or credit
9 card numbers may not be included in the Private Information that was exfiltrated in the Data
10 Breach, criminals may still easily create a Fullz package and sell it at a higher price to
11 unscrupulous operators and criminals (such as illegal and scam telemarketers) over and over.

12 133. The existence and prevalence of “Fullz” packages means that the Private
13 Information stolen from the data breach can easily be linked to the unregulated data (like
14 contact information) of Plaintiffs and the other Class Members.

15 134. Thus, even if certain information (such as contact information) was not stolen in
16 the data breach, criminals can still easily create a comprehensive “Fullz” package.

17 135. Then, this comprehensive dossier can be sold—and then resold in perpetuity—to
18 crooked operators and other criminals (like illegal and scam telemarketers).

19
20
21
22 ***Loss of Time to Mitigate Risk of Identity Theft & Fraud***

23 136. As a result of the recognized risk of identity theft, when a Data Breach occurs,
24 and an individual is notified by a company that their Private Information was compromised, as
25
26

27 *Records for Sale in Underground Stolen From Texas Life Insurance Firm, Krebs on Security*
(Sep. 18, 2014), <https://krebsonsecurity.com/2014/09/medical-records-for-sale-in-underground->

1 in this Data Breach, the reasonable person is expected to take steps and spend time to address
2 the dangerous situation, learn about the breach, and otherwise mitigate the risk of becoming a
3 victim of identity theft and fraud. Failure to spend time taking steps to review accounts or
4 credit reports could expose the individual to greater financial harm—yet, the resource and asset
5 of time has been lost.

6
7 137. The steps that Plaintiffs and Class Members must take in order to protect
8 themselves from identity theft and/or fraud demonstrates the significant time that Plaintiffs and
9 Class Members must undertake in response to the Data Breach. Plaintiffs’ and Class Members’
10 time is highly valuable and irreplaceable, and accordingly, Plaintiffs and Class Members
11 suffered actual injury and damages in the form of lost time that they spent on mitigation
12 activities in response to the Data Breach.

13
14 138. Plaintiffs and Class Members have spent, and will spend additional time, on a
15 variety of prudent actions, such as researching and verifying the legitimacy of the Data Breach,
16 signing up for the credit monitoring services, and monitoring their financial accounts for any
17 unusual activity, which may take years to detect. Accordingly, the Data Breach has caused
18 Plaintiffs and Class Members to suffer actual injury in the form of lost time spent on mitigation
19 activities—which cannot be recaptured.

20
21 139. Plaintiffs’ mitigation efforts are consistent with the U.S. Government
22 Accountability Office that released a report in 2007 regarding data breaches (“GAO Report”) in
23 which it noted that victims of identity theft will face “substantial costs and time to repair the

24
25
26
27 [stolen-from-texas-life-insurance-\]\(https://krebsonsecurity.com/2014/09/medical-records-for-sale-in-underground-stolen-from-texas-life-insurance-finn/.](https://krebsonsecurity.com/2014/09/medical-records-for-sale-in-underground-stolen-from-texas-life-insurance-finn/)

1 damage to their good name and credit record.”⁴⁴

2 140. Plaintiffs’ mitigation efforts are also consistent with the steps the FTC
3 recommends that data breach victims take to protect their personal and financial information
4 after a data breach, including: contacting one of the credit bureaus to place a fraud alert
5 (consider an extended fraud alert that lasts for seven years if someone steals their identity),
6 reviewing their credit reports, contacting companies to remove fraudulent charges from their
7 accounts, placing a credit freeze on their credit, and correcting their credit reports.⁴⁵
8

9 ***Diminution of Value of Private Information***

10 141. PII and PHI are valuable property.⁴⁶ Their value is axiomatic, considering the
11 value of Big Data in corporate America and that the consequences of cyber thefts include heavy
12 prison sentences. Even this obvious risk to reward analysis illustrates beyond doubt that Private
13 Information has considerable market value.
14

15 142. Sensitive PII can sell for as much as \$363 per record according to the Infosec
16 Institute.⁴⁷
17

18 143. An active and robust legitimate marketplace for PII also exists. In 2019, the data
19 brokering industry was worth roughly \$200 billion.⁴⁸
20

21 _____
22 ⁴⁴ See United States Government Accountability Office, GAO-07-737, *Personal Information: Data Breaches Are Frequent, but Evidence of Resulting Identity Theft Is Limited; However, the Full Extent Is Unknown* (June 2007), <https://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07737.pdf>.
23

24 ⁴⁵ See Federal Trade Commission, *Identity Theft.gov*, <https://www.identitytheft.gov/Steps>

25 ⁴⁶ See “*Data Breaches Are Frequent, but Evidence of Resulting Identity Theft Is Limited; However, the Full Extent Is Unknown*,” p. 2, U.S. Government Accountability Office, June 2007, <https://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07737.pdf> (“GAO Report”).
26

27 ⁴⁷ See, e.g., John T. Soma, et al., *Corporate Privacy Trend: The “Value” of Personally Identifiable Information (“Private Information”) Equals the “Value” of Financial Assets*, 15 Rich. J.L. & Tech. 11, at *3-4 (2009) (“Private Information, which companies obtain at little

1 144. In fact, the data marketplace is so sophisticated that patients can actually sell
2 their non-public information directly to a data broker who in turn aggregates the information
3 and provides it to marketers or app developers.^{49,50}

4 145. Consumers who agree to provide their web browsing history to the Nielsen
5 Corporation can receive up to \$50.00 a year.⁵¹

6
7 146. Theft of PHI is also gravely serious: “[a] thief may use your name or health
8 insurance numbers to see a doctor, get prescription drugs, file claims with your insurance
9 provider, or get other care. If the thief’s health information is mixed with yours, your treatment,
10 insurance and payment records, and credit report may be affected.”⁵²

11 147. As a result of the Data Breach, Plaintiffs’ and Class Members’ Private
12 Information, which has an inherent market value in both legitimate and dark markets, has been
13 damaged and diminished by its compromise and unauthorized release. However, this transfer of
14 value occurred without any consideration paid to Plaintiffs or Class Members for their property,
15 resulting in an economic loss. Moreover, the Private Information is now readily available, and
16 the rarity of the Data has been lost, thereby causing additional loss of value.

17
18 148. At all relevant times, Defendants knew, or reasonably should have known, of the
19 importance of safeguarding the Private Information of Plaintiffs and Class Members, and of the
20

21 cost, has quantifiable value that is rapidly reaching a level comparable to the value of
22 traditional financial assets.”) (citations omitted).

23 ⁴⁸ See Ashiq Ja, *Hackers Selling Healthcare Data in the Black Market*, InfoSec (July 27, 2015),
24 <https://resources.infosecinstitute.com/topic/hackers-selling-healthcare-data-in-the-black-market/>.

25 ⁴⁹ <https://www.latimes.com/business/story/2019-11-05/column-data-brokers>.

26 ⁵⁰ <https://datacoup.com/>.

27 ⁵¹ <https://digi.me/what-is-digime/>.

⁵² See *Medical I.D. Theft*, *supra* note 23.

1 foreseeable consequences that would occur if Defendants' data security system was breached,
2 including, specifically, the significant costs that would be imposed on Plaintiffs and Class
3 Members as a result of a breach.

4 149. The fraudulent activity resulting from the Data Breach may not come to light for
5 years.
6

7 150. Plaintiffs and Class Members now face years of constant surveillance of their
8 financial and personal records, monitoring accounts, and loss of rights. The Class is incurring
9 and will continue to incur such damages in addition to any fraudulent use of their Private
10 Information.

11 151. Defendants were, or should have been, fully aware of the unique type and the
12 significant volume of data on Defendants' network, amounting on information and belief to
13 more thousands of individuals' detailed personal information and, thus, the significant number
14 of individuals who would be harmed by the exposure of the unencrypted data.
15

16 152. The injuries to Plaintiffs and Class Members were directly and proximately
17 caused by Defendants' failure to implement or maintain adequate data security measures for the
18 Private Information of Plaintiffs and Class Members.
19

20 ***Loss of Benefit of The Bargain***

21 153. Furthermore, Defendants' poor data security practices deprived Plaintiffs and
22 Class Members of the benefit of their bargain. When agreeing to pay Defendants and/or their
23 agents for medical products and/or services, Plaintiffs and other reasonable patients understood
24 and expected that they were, in part, paying for the services and necessary data security to
25 protect their Private Information, when in fact, Defendants did not provide the expected data
26 security. Accordingly, Plaintiffs and Class Members received products and/or services that
27

1 were of a lesser value than what they reasonably expected to receive under the bargains they
2 struck with Defendants.

3 **REPRESENTATIVE PLAINTIFFS' EXPERIENCES**

4 *Plaintiff Genevieve Bardwell's Experience*

5 154. Plaintiff Genevieve Bardwell is and at times mentioned herein was a patient of
6 Defendant Mt. Baker since approximately October 2024.

7 As a condition of receiving healthcare services, Plaintiff was required to provide her
8 sensitive personal and medical information to Defendants.

9 Plaintiff provided her Sensitive Information to Defendants with the reasonable
10 expectation that Defendants would protect and secure this information from unauthorized
11 access and disclosure.

12 On information and belief, Plaintiff's Sensitive Information, including her name, date of
13 birth, address, Social Security number, driver's license number, medical record number, lab
14 results, treatment information, health insurance information, provider names, and/or financial
15 information, was improperly accessed or obtained by unauthorized third parties when the Data
16 Breach occurred.

17 Plaintiff reasonably expected and understood that Defendants would take, at a
18 minimum, industry standard precautions to protect, maintain, and safeguard her Sensitive
19 Information from unauthorized users or disclosure, and would timely notify her of any data
20 security incidents related to the same. Plaintiff would not have used Defendants' services had
21 she known that Defendants would not take reasonable steps to safeguard her Sensitive
22 Information.

23 Plaintiff is very careful about sharing her sensitive PII and PHI. She has never
24 knowingly transmitted unencrypted sensitive PII over the internet or any other unsecured
25

1 source. Furthermore, Plaintiff stores any documents containing her sensitive information in a
2 safe and secure location or destroys the documents. Moreover, she diligently chooses unique
3 usernames and passwords for her various online accounts.

4 As a result of the Data Breach, Plaintiff made reasonable efforts to mitigate the impact
5 of the Data Breach, including but not limited to researching the Data Breach, reviewing
6 financial statements, monitoring her credit information, and changing passwords on her various
7 accounts.

8
9 Upon information and belief, Plaintiff Bardwell suffered actual injury from having her
10 sensitive information exposed and/or stolen as a result of the Data Breach.

11 ***Plaintiff Jeff Eberlein's Experience***

12 Plaintiff Jeff Eberlein has received medical services from Defendants.

13
14 On or about April 9, 2025, Plaintiff learned of the Data Breach, and became informed of
15 the substantive details of the Data Breach based on Defendants' Notification of Data Security
16 Incident which is posted on their website.⁵³

17
18 Following the Data Breach, Plaintiff has experienced a substantial uptick in the number
19 and frequency of spam emails, as well as a significant increase in spam phone calls –
20 something that was not a frequent occurrence prior to the date of the Data Breach.

21 Plaintiff has made, and will continue to make, reasonable efforts to mitigate the impact
22 of the Data Breach, including, but not limited to: researching the Data Breach; reviewing credit
23 reports, medical records, credit monitoring, and financial account statements for any indications
24 of actual or attempted identity theft or fraud; researching credit monitoring and identity theft
25 protection services offered by Defendants; and dealing with unwanted spam emails, texts, and
26

27 ⁵³ *Id.*

1 telephone calls.

2 Since Plaintiff became aware of the Data Breach, he has already spent hours dealing
3 with the Data Breach, which is valuable time he otherwise would have spent on other activities,
4 including but not limited to work and/or recreation.

5 As a result of the Data Breach, Plaintiff has suffered emotional distress due to the
6 release of his Private Information, which he believed would be protected from unauthorized
7 access and disclosure, including anxiety about unauthorized parties viewing, selling, and/or
8 using his Private Information for purposes of identity theft and fraud. Plaintiff is very
9 concerned about identity theft and fraud, as well as the consequences of such identity theft and
10 fraud resulting from the Data Breach.

11 Plaintiff suffered actual injury from having his Private Information compromised as a
12 result of the Data Breach including, but not limited to: (a) damage to and diminution in the
13 value of his Private Information, a form of property that Defendants obtained from Plaintiff; (b)
14 violation of his privacy rights; (c) present, imminent, and impending injury arising from the
15 increased risk of identity theft and fraud, and (d) identity theft as defined by RCW 9.35.020(1).

16 As a result of the Data Breach, Plaintiff anticipates spending considerable time and
17 money on an ongoing basis to try to mitigate and address harms caused by the Data Breach.

18 As a result of the Data Breach, Plaintiff is at present risk and will continue to be at
19 increased risk of identity theft and fraud for years to come.

20
21
22
23 ***Plaintiff Jeffrey Kahn's Experience***

24 155. Plaintiff Jeffrey Kahn has received medical services from Defendants.

25 156. As a condition of obtaining services from Defendants, he was required to
26 provide his Private Information to Defendants, including his name, date of birth, Social
27

1 Security number, and other sensitive information, including health information.

2 157. Upon information and belief, at the time of the Data Breach, Defendants
3 maintained Plaintiff's Private Information in their systems.

4 158. Plaintiff suffered actual injury from having his Private Information
5 compromised as a result of the Data Breach including, but not limited to: (i) invasion of
6 privacy; (ii) theft of his Private Information; (iii) lost or diminished value of Private
7 Information; (iv) lost time and opportunity costs associated with attempting to mitigate the
8 actual consequences of the Data Breach; (v) loss of benefit of the bargain; (vi) lost opportunity
9 costs associated with attempting to mitigate the actual consequences of the Data Breach; (vii)
10 nominal damages; and (viii) the continued and certainly increased risk to his Private
11 Information, which: (a) remains unencrypted and available for unauthorized third parties to
12 access and abuse; and (b) remains backed up in Defendants' possession and is subject to further
13 unauthorized disclosures so long as Defendants fail to undertake appropriate and adequate
14 measures to protect the Private Information.
15
16

17 159. As a result of the Data Breach, Plaintiff anticipates spending considerable time
18 and money on an ongoing basis to try to mitigate and address harms caused by the Data Breach.

19 160. As a result of the Data Breach, Plaintiff is at a present risk and will continue to
20 be at increased risk of identity theft and fraud for years to come.

21 161. Plaintiff has a continuing interest in ensuring that his Private Information,
22 which, upon information and belief, remains backed up in Defendants' possession, is protected
23 and safeguarded from future breaches.
24

25 //

26 //

1 *Plaintiff Leslie Swope's Experience*

2 162. Plaintiff Swope has received medical services from Defendants and provided her
3 Private Information to Defendants in exchange for services.

4 163. At the time of the Data Breach, Defendants retained Plaintiff's Private
5 Information in their system.

6 164. Plaintiff's Private Information was compromised in the Data Breach and stolen
7 by cybercriminals who illegally accessed Defendants' network for the specific purpose of
8 targeting the Private Information.
9

10 165. Plaintiff takes reasonable measures to protect her Private Information. She has
11 never knowingly transmitted unencrypted Private Information over the internet or other
12 unsecured source.

13 166. Plaintiff stores any documents containing her Private Information in a safe and
14 secure location and diligently chooses unique usernames and passwords for her online
15 accounts.
16

17 167. As a result of the Data Breach, Plaintiff has suffered a loss of time and has spent
18 and continues to spend time monitoring her account and credit score and has sustained
19 emotional distress. This is time that was lost and unproductive and took away from other
20 activities and work duties.

21 168. Plaintiff also suffered actual injury in the form of damages to and diminution in
22 the value of her Private Information—a form of intangible property that she entrusted to
23 Defendants for the purpose of obtaining services from Defendants, which was compromised in
24 and as a result of the Data Breach.
25

26 169. Since the Data Breach, Plaintiff has experienced an increase in spam calls and
27

1 texts.

2 170. Plaintiff suffered lost time, interference, and inconvenience as a result of the
3 Data Breach and has anxiety and increased concerns for the loss of her privacy.

4 171. Plaintiff has suffered imminent and impending injury arising from the
5 substantially increased risk of fraud, identity theft, and misuse resulting from her Private
6 Information, especially her name, Social Security number, and PHI, being placed in the hands
7 of criminals.

9 172. Defendants obtained and continues to maintain Plaintiff's Private Information
10 and has a continuing legal duty and obligation to protect that Private Information from
11 unauthorized access and disclosure. Plaintiff's Private Information was compromised and
12 disclosed as a result of the Data Breach.

13 173. As a result of the Data Breach, Plaintiff anticipates spending considerable time
14 and money on an ongoing basis to try to mitigate and address harms caused by the Data Breach.
15 As a result of the Data Breach, Plaintiff is at present risk and will continue to be at increased
16 risk of identity theft and fraud for years to come.

18 ***Plaintiff Joanne Herman's Experience***

19 174. Plaintiff Herman has received medical services from Defendants and provided
20 her Private Information to Defendants in exchange for services.

21 175. At the time of the Data Breach, Defendants retained Plaintiff's Private
22 Information in their system.

23 176. Plaintiff's Private Information was compromised in the Data Breach and stolen
24 by cybercriminals who illegally accessed Defendants' network for the specific purpose of
25 targeting the Private Information.
26
27

1 177. Plaintiff takes reasonable measures to protect her Private Information. She has
2 never knowingly transmitted unencrypted Private Information over the internet or other
3 unsecured source.

4 178. Plaintiff stores any documents containing her Private Information in a safe and
5 secure location and diligently chooses unique usernames and passwords for her online
6 accounts.

7
8 179. As a result of the Data Breach, Plaintiff has suffered a loss of time and has spent
9 and continues to spend time monitoring her account and credit score and has sustained
10 emotional distress. This is time that was lost and unproductive and took away from other
11 activities and work duties.

12 180. Plaintiff also suffered actual injury in the form of damages to and diminution in
13 the value of her Private Information—a form of intangible property that she entrusted to
14 Defendants for the purpose of obtaining services from Defendants, which was compromised in
15 and as a result of the Data Breach.

16
17 181. Since the Data Breach, Plaintiff has experienced an increase in spam calls and
18 texts.

19 182. Plaintiff suffered lost time, interference, and inconvenience as a result of the
20 Data Breach and has anxiety and increased concerns for the loss of her privacy.

21 183. Plaintiff has suffered imminent and impending injury arising from the
22 substantially increased risk of fraud, identity theft, and misuse resulting from her Private
23 Information, especially her name, Social Security number, and PHI, being placed in the hands
24 of criminals.

25
26 184. Defendants obtained and continues to maintain Plaintiff's Private Information
27

1 and has a continuing legal duty and obligation to protect that Private Information from
2 unauthorized access and disclosure. Plaintiff's Private Information was compromised and
3 disclosed as a result of the Data Breach.

4 185. As a result of the Data Breach, Plaintiff anticipates spending considerable time
5 and money on an ongoing basis to try to mitigate and address harms caused by the Data Breach.
6 As a result of the Data Breach, Plaintiff is at present risk and will continue to be at increased
7 risk of identity theft and fraud for years to come.
8

9 ***Plaintiff Naomi Liebhold Experience***

10 186. Plaintiff Liebhold has received medical services from Defendants and provided
11 her Private Information to Defendants in exchange for services.

12 187. At the time of the Data Breach, Defendants retained Plaintiff's Private
13 Information in their system.

14 188. Plaintiff's Private Information was compromised in the Data Breach and stolen
15 by cybercriminals who illegally accessed Defendants' network for the specific purpose of
16 targeting the Private Information.
17

18 189. Plaintiff takes reasonable measures to protect her Private Information. She has
19 never knowingly transmitted unencrypted Private Information over the internet or other
20 unsecured source.
21

22 190. Plaintiff stores any documents containing her Private Information in a safe and
23 secure location and diligently chooses unique usernames and passwords for her online
24 accounts.

25 191. As a result of the Data Breach, Plaintiff has suffered a loss of time and has spent
26 and continues to spend time monitoring her account and credit score and has sustained
27

1 emotional distress. This is time that was lost and unproductive and took away from other
2 activities and work duties.

3 192. Plaintiff also suffered actual injury in the form of damages to and diminution in
4 the value of her Private Information—a form of intangible property that she entrusted to
5 Defendants for the purpose of obtaining services from Defendants, which was compromised in
6 and as a result of the Data Breach.
7

8 193. Since the Data Breach, Plaintiff has experienced an increase in spam calls and
9 texts.

10 194. Plaintiff suffered lost time, interference, and inconvenience as a result of the
11 Data Breach and has anxiety and increased concerns for the loss of her privacy.

12 195. Plaintiff has suffered imminent and impending injury arising from the
13 substantially increased risk of fraud, identity theft, and misuse resulting from her Private
14 Information, especially her name, Social Security number, and PHI, being placed in the hands
15 of criminals.
16

17 196. Defendants obtained and continues to maintain Plaintiff's Private Information
18 and has a continuing legal duty and obligation to protect that Private Information from
19 unauthorized access and disclosure. Plaintiff's Private Information was compromised and
20 disclosed as a result of the Data Breach.
21

22 197. As a result of the Data Breach, Plaintiff anticipates spending considerable time
23 and money on an ongoing basis to try to mitigate and address harms caused by the Data Breach.

24 198. As a result of the Data Breach, Plaintiff is at present risk and will continue to be
25 at increased risk of identity theft and fraud for years to come.
26
27

1 ***Plaintiff Daniel Uitdenhowen's Experience***

2 199. Plaintiff Daniel Uitdenhowen has received medical services from Defendants.

3 200. As a condition of obtaining medical services from Defendants, he was required
4 to provide his Private Information to Defendants, including his name, date of birth, Social
5 Security number, and other sensitive information, including health information.

6 201. Upon information and belief, at the time of the Data Breach, Defendants
7 maintained Plaintiff's Private Information in their systems.

8 202. Defendant deprived Plaintiff of the earliest opportunity to guard himself against
9 the Data Breach's effects by failing to formally and promptly notify him.

10 203. As a result of their inadequate cybersecurity, Defendant exposed Plaintiff's
11 Sensitive Information for theft by cybercriminals and sale on the dark web.

12 204. As a result of the Data Breach, Plaintiff spent time dealing with the
13 consequences of the Data Breach, which includes self-monitoring his accounts and credit
14 reports to ensure no fraudulent activity has occurred. This time has been lost forever and cannot
15 be recaptured.

16 205. Plaintiff has and will spend considerable time and effort monitoring his accounts
17 to protect himself from additional identity theft. Plaintiff fears for his personal financial
18 security and uncertainty over what Sensitive Information was exposed in the Data Breach.

19 206. Plaintiff has and is experiencing feelings of anxiety, stress, fear, and frustration
20 because of the Data Breach. This goes far beyond allegations of mere worry or inconvenience;
21 it is exactly the sort of injury and harm to a Data Breach victim that the law contemplates and
22 addresses.

23 207. Plaintiff has suffered actual injury in the form of damages to and diminution in
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25
26
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1 the value of his Sensitive Information---a form of intangible property that Plaintiff entrusted to
2 Defendant, which was compromised in and as a result of the Data Breach.

3 208. Plaintiff suffered actual injury from the exposure of his Sensitive Information---
4 which violates his rights to privacy.

5 209. Plaintiff has suffered imminent and impending injury arising from the
6 substantially increased risk of fraud, identity theft, and misuse resulting from his Sensitive
7 Information being placed in the hands of unauthorized third parties and possibly criminals.
8

9 210. Indeed, following Data Breach, Plaintiff began receiving emailed receipts for
10 purchases that he did not recognize and certainly did not authorize. As a result, Plaintiff has
11 been forced to spend significant amounts of time and effort verifying the legitimacy of these
12 emailed receipts. Furthermore, these emails suggest that his Sensitive Information is now in the
13 hands of cybercriminals.
14

15 211. Plaintiff is also experiencing a significant increase in spam texts and phone calls
16 following the breach, further suggesting that his Sensitive Information is now in the hands of
17 cybercriminals.

18 212. Plaintiff suffered actual injury from having his Private Information
19 compromised as a result of the Data Breach including, but not limited to: (i) invasion of
20 privacy; (ii) theft of his Private Information; (iii) lost or diminished value of Private
21 Information; (iv) lost time and opportunity costs associated with attempting to mitigate the
22 actual consequences of the Data Breach; (v) loss of benefit of the bargain; (vi) nominal
23 damages; and (vii) the continued and certainly increased risk to his Private Information, which:
24 (a) remains unencrypted and available for unauthorized third parties to access and abuse; and
25 (b) remains backed up in Defendants' possession and is subject to further unauthorized
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1 disclosures so long as Defendants fail to undertake appropriate and adequate measures to
2 protect the Private Information.

3 213. As a result of the Data Breach, Plaintiff anticipates spending considerable time
4 and money on an ongoing basis to try to mitigate and address harms caused by the Data Breach.

5 214. As a result of the Data Breach, Plaintiff is at a present risk and will continue to
6 be at increased risk of identity theft and fraud for years to come.

7 215. Plaintiff has a continuing interest in ensuring that his Private Information,
8 which, upon information and belief, remains backed up in Defendants' possession, is protected
9 and safeguarded from future breaches.
10

11 ***Plaintiff Michael Barr's Experience***

12 216. Plaintiff Michael Barr has received medical services from Defendants.

13 217. As a condition of obtaining medical services from Defendants, he was required
14 to provide his Private Information to Defendants, including his name, date of birth, Social
15 Security number, and other sensitive information, including health information.
16

17 218. Upon information and belief, at the time of the Data Breach, Defendants
18 maintained Plaintiff's Private Information in their systems.

19 219. Defendant deprived Plaintiff of the earliest opportunity to guard himself against
20 the Data Breach's effects by failing to formally and promptly notify him.

21 220. As a result of their inadequate cybersecurity, Defendant exposed Plaintiff's
22 Sensitive Information for theft by cybercriminals and sale on the dark web.
23

24 221. As a result of the Data Breach, Plaintiff spent time dealing with the
25 consequences of the Data Breach, which includes self-monitoring his accounts and credit
26 reports to ensure no fraudulent activity has occurred. This time has been lost forever and cannot
27

1 be recaptured.

2 222. Plaintiff has and will spend considerable time and effort monitoring his accounts
3 to protect himself from additional identity theft. Plaintiff fears for his personal financial
4 security and uncertainty over what Sensitive Information was exposed in the Data Breach.

5 223. Plaintiff has and is experiencing feelings of anxiety, stress, fear, and frustration
6 because of the Data Breach. This goes far beyond allegations of mere worry or inconvenience;
7 it is exactly the sort of injury and harm to a Data Breach victim that the law contemplates and
8 addresses.
9

10 224. Plaintiff has suffered actual injury in the form of damages to and diminution in
11 the value of his Sensitive Information---a form of intangible property that Plaintiff entrusted to
12 Defendant, which was compromised in and as a result of the Data Breach.

13 225. Plaintiff suffered actual injury from the exposure of his Sensitive Information---
14 which violates his rights to privacy.
15

16 226. Plaintiff has suffered imminent and impending injury arising from the
17 substantially increased risk of fraud, identity theft, and misuse resulting from his Sensitive
18 Information being placed in the hands of unauthorized third parties and possibly criminals.

19 227. Indeed, following Data Breach, Plaintiff is now experiencing a significant
20 increase in spam texts, suggesting that his Sensitive Information is now in the hands of
21 cybercriminals.
22

23 228. Plaintiff suffered actual injury from having his Private Information
24 compromised as a result of the Data Breach including, but not limited to: (i) invasion of
25 privacy; (ii) theft of his Private Information; (iii) lost or diminished value of Private
26 Information; (iv) lost time and opportunity costs associated with attempting to mitigate the
27

1 actual consequences of the Data Breach; (v) loss of benefit of the bargain; (vi) lost opportunity
2 costs associated with attempting to mitigate the actual consequences of the Data Breach; (vii)
3 nominal damages; and (viii) the continued and certainly increased risk to his Private
4 Information, which: (a) remains unencrypted and available for unauthorized third parties to
5 access and abuse; and (b) remains backed up in Defendants' possession and is subject to further
6 unauthorized disclosures so long as Defendants fail to undertake appropriate and adequate
7 measures to protect the Private Information.
8

9 229. As a result of the Data Breach, Plaintiff anticipates spending considerable time
10 and money on an ongoing basis to try to mitigate and address harms caused by the Data Breach.

11 230. As a result of the Data Breach, Plaintiff is at a present risk and will continue to
12 be at increased risk of identity theft and fraud for years to come.

13 231. Plaintiff has a continuing interest in ensuring that his Private Information,
14 which, upon information and belief, remains backed up in Defendants' possession, is protected
15 and safeguarded from future breaches.
16

17 ***Plaintiff Thomas Schumann's Experience***

18 232. Plaintiff Thomas Schumann has received medical services from Defendants.

19 233. As a condition of obtaining medical services from Defendants, he was required
20 to provide his Private Information to Defendants, including his name, date of birth, Social
21 Security number, and other sensitive information, including health information.
22

23 234. Upon information and belief, at the time of the Data Breach, Defendants
24 maintained Plaintiff's Private Information in their systems.

25 235. Plaintiff suffered actual injury from having his Private Information
26 compromised as a result of the Data Breach including, but not limited to: (i) invasion of
27

1 privacy; (ii) theft of his Private Information; (iii) lost or diminished value of Private
2 Information; (iv) lost time and opportunity costs associated with attempting to mitigate the
3 actual consequences of the Data Breach; (v) loss of benefit of the bargain; (vi) lost opportunity
4 costs associated with attempting to mitigate the actual consequences of the Data Breach; (vii)
5 nominal damages; and (viii) the continued and certainly increased risk to his Private
6 Information, which: (a) remains unencrypted and available for unauthorized third parties to
7 access and abuse; and (b) remains backed up in Defendants' possession and is subject to further
8 unauthorized disclosures so long as Defendants fail to undertake appropriate and adequate
9 measures to protect the Private Information.
10

11 236. As a result of the Data Breach, Plaintiff anticipates spending considerable time
12 and money on an ongoing basis to try to mitigate and address harms caused by the Data Breach.
13

14 237. As a result of the Data Breach, Plaintiff is at a present risk and will continue to
15 be at increased risk of identity theft and fraud for years to come.

16 238. Plaintiff has a continuing interest in ensuring that his Private Information,
17 which, upon information and belief, remains backed up in Defendants' possession, is protected
18 and safeguarded from future breaches.
19

20 CLASS ALLEGATIONS

21 239. Pursuant to Washington Civil Rule 23, Plaintiffs propose the following Class
22 definition, subject to amendment as appropriate:

23 All individuals residing in the United States whose Private
24 Information was accessed and/or acquired by an unauthorized
25 party as a result of the Data Breach reported by Defendants in
26 March 2025 (the "Class").

27 240. Excluded from the Class are the following individuals and/or entities:
Defendants and Defendants' parents, subsidiaries, affiliates, officers and directors, and any
entity in which Defendants have a controlling interest; all individuals who make a timely

1 election to be excluded from this proceeding using the correct protocol for opting out; and all
2 judges assigned to hear any aspect of this litigation, as well as their immediate family members.

3 241. Plaintiffs reserve the right to amend the definitions of the Class or add a Class or
4 Subclass if further information and discovery indicate that the definitions of the Class should be
5 narrowed, expanded, or otherwise modified.

6 242. Numerosity: The members of the Class are so numerous that joinder of all
7 members is impracticable, if not completely impossible. Although the precise number of
8 individuals is currently unknown to Plaintiffs and exclusively in the possession of Defendants,
9 upon information and belief, thousands of individuals were impacted.

10 243. Common questions of law and fact exist as to all members of the Class and
11 predominate over any questions affecting solely individual members of the Class. Included
12 among the questions of law and fact common to the Class that predominate over questions
13 which may affect individual Class Members, are the following:

- 14 a. Whether and to what extent Defendants had a duty to protect the Private
15 Information of Plaintiffs and Class Members;
- 16 b. Whether Defendants had a duty to not disclose the Private Information of
17 Plaintiffs and Class Members to unauthorized third parties;
- 18 c. Whether Defendants had the duty to not use the Private Information of
19 Plaintiffs and Class Members for non-business purposes;
- 20 d. Whether Defendants failed to adequately safeguard the Private
21 Information of Plaintiffs and Class Members;
- 22 e. When Defendants actually learned of the Data Breach;
- 23 f. Whether Defendants adequately, promptly, and accurately informed
24 Plaintiffs and Class Members that their Private Information had been
25 compromised;
- 26
- 27

- 1 g. Whether Defendants violated the law by failing to promptly notify
2 Plaintiffs and Class Members that their Private Information had been
3 compromised;
- 4 h. Whether Defendants failed to implement and maintain reasonable
5 security procedures and practices appropriate to the nature and scope of
6 the information compromised in the Data Breach;
- 7 i. Whether Defendants adequately addressed and fixed the vulnerabilities
8 which permitted the Data Breach to occur;
- 9 j. Whether Plaintiffs and Class Members are entitled to actual damages,
10 treble damages, and/or nominal damages as a result of Defendants'
11 wrongful conduct;
- 12 k. Whether Plaintiffs and Class Members are entitled to injunctive relief to
13 redress the imminent and currently ongoing harm faced as a result of the
14 Data Breach.

15 244. Typicality: Plaintiffs' claims are typical of those of the other patients of the
16 Class because Plaintiffs, like every other Class Member, were exposed to virtually identical
17 conduct and now suffer from the same violations of the law as every other member of the
18 Class.
19 Class.

20 245. Policies Generally Applicable to the Class: This class action is also appropriate
21 for certification because Defendants acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to
22 the Class, thereby requiring the Court's imposition of uniform relief to ensure compatible
23 standards of conduct toward the Class Members and making final injunctive relief appropriate
24 with respect to the Class as a whole. Defendants' policies challenged herein apply to and affect
25 Class Members uniformly and Plaintiffs' challenges of these policies hinges on Defendants'
26 conduct with respect to the Class as a whole, not on facts or law applicable only to Plaintiffs.
27

1 246. Adequacy: Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately represent and protect the
2 interests of the Class Members in that they have no disabling conflicts of interest that would be
3 antagonistic to those of the other Class Members. Plaintiffs seek no relief that is antagonistic or
4 adverse to the Class Members and the infringement of the rights and the damages they have
5 suffered are typical of other Class Members. Plaintiffs have retained counsel experienced in
6 complex class action and data breach litigation, and Plaintiffs intend to prosecute this action
7 vigorously.
8

9 247. Superiority and Manageability: The class litigation is an appropriate method for
10 fair and efficient adjudication of the claims involved. Class action treatment is superior to all
11 other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy alleged herein;
12 it will permit a large number of Class Members to prosecute their common claims in a single
13 forum simultaneously, efficiently, and without the unnecessary duplication of evidence, effort,
14 and expense that hundreds of individual actions would require. Class action treatment will
15 permit the adjudication of relatively modest claims by certain Class Members, who could not
16 individually afford to litigate a complex claim against corporations, like Defendants. Further,
17 even for those Class Members who could afford to litigate such a claim, it would still be
18 economically impractical and impose a burden on the courts.
19

20 248. The nature of this action and the nature of laws available to Plaintiffs and Class
21 Members makes the use of the class action device a particularly efficient and appropriate
22 procedure to afford relief to Plaintiffs and Class Members for the wrongs alleged because
23 Defendants would necessarily gain an unconscionable advantage since they would be able to
24 exploit and overwhelm the limited resources of each individual Class Member with superior
25 financial and legal resources; the costs of individual suits could unreasonably consume the
26
27

1 255. Defendants had full knowledge of the sensitivity of the Private Information and
2 the types of harm that Plaintiffs and Class Members could and would suffer if the Private
3 Information was wrongfully disclosed.

4 256. By assuming the responsibility to collect and store this data, and in fact doing
5 so, and sharing it and using it for commercial gain, Defendants had a duty of care to use
6 reasonable means to secure and safeguard their computer property—and Class Members’
7 Private Information held within it—to prevent disclosure of the information, and to safeguard
8 the information from theft. Defendants’ duty included a responsibility to implement processes
9 by which they could detect a breach of their security systems in a reasonably expeditious period
10 of time and to give prompt notice to those affected in the case of a data breach.

11 257. Defendants had a duty to employ reasonable security measures under Section 5
12 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45, which prohibits “unfair . . . practices in
13 or affecting commerce,” including, as interpreted and enforced by the FTC, the unfair practice
14 of failing to use reasonable measures to protect confidential data.

15 258. Defendants’ duty to use reasonable security measures under HIPAA required
16 Defendants to “reasonably protect” confidential data from “any intentional or unintentional use
17 or disclosure” and to “have in place appropriate administrative, technical, and physical
18 safeguards to protect the privacy of protected health information.” 45 C.F.R. § 164.530(c)(1).
19 Some or all of the healthcare and/or medical information at issue in this case constitutes
20 “protected health information” within the meaning of HIPAA.
21

22 259. Defendants owed a duty of care to Plaintiffs and Class Members to provide data
23 security consistent with industry standards and other requirements discussed herein, and to
24
25
26
27

1 ensure that their systems and networks, and the personnel responsible for them, adequately
2 protected the Private Information.

3 260. Defendants’ duty of care to use reasonable security measures arose as a result of
4 the special relationship that existed between Defendants and their patients. That special
5 relationship arose because Plaintiffs and the Class entrusted Defendants with their confidential
6 Private Information, a necessary part of being patients of Defendants.
7

8 261. Defendants’ duty to use reasonable care in protecting confidential data arose not
9 only as a result of the statutes and regulations described above, but also because Defendants are
10 bound by industry standards to protect confidential Private Information.

11 262. Defendants are subject to an “independent duty,” untethered to any contract
12 between Defendants and Plaintiffs or the Class.

13 263. Defendants also had a duty to exercise appropriate clearinghouse practices to
14 remove former patients’ Private Information they were no longer required to retain pursuant to
15 regulations.
16

17 264. Moreover, Defendants had a duty to promptly and adequately notify Plaintiffs
18 and the Class of the Data Breach.

19 265. Defendants had and continue to have a duty to adequately disclose that the
20 Private Information of Plaintiffs and the Class within Defendants’ possession might have been
21 compromised, how it was compromised, and precisely the types of data that were compromised
22 and when. Such notice was necessary to allow Plaintiffs and the Class to take steps to prevent,
23 mitigate, and repair any identity theft and the fraudulent use of their Private Information by
24 third parties.
25
26
27

1 266. Defendants breached their duties, pursuant to the FTC Act, HIPAA, and other
2 applicable standards, and thus were negligent, by failing to use reasonable measures to protect
3 Class Members' Private Information.

4 267. Plaintiffs and the Class are within the class of persons that the FTC Act and
5 HIPAA were intended to protect.

6 268. The harm that occurred as a result of the Data Breach is the type of harm the
7 FTC Act and HIPAA were intended to guard against.

8 269. Defendants' violation of Section 5 of the FTC Act and HIPAA constitutes
9 negligence.

10 270. The FTC has pursued enforcement actions against businesses, which, as a result
11 of their failure to employ reasonable data security measures and avoid unfair and deceptive
12 practices, caused the same harm as that suffered by Plaintiffs and the Class.

13 271. A breach of security, unauthorized access, and resulting injury to Plaintiffs and
14 the Class was reasonably foreseeable, particularly in light of Defendants' inadequate security
15 practices.

16 272. It was foreseeable that Defendants' failure to use reasonable measures to protect
17 Class Members' Private Information would result in injury to Class Members. Further, the
18 breach of security was reasonably foreseeable given the known high frequency of cyberattacks
19 and data breaches in the healthcare industry.

20 273. Defendants had full knowledge of the sensitivity of the Private Information and
21 the types of harm that Plaintiffs and the Class could and would suffer if the Private Information
22 were wrongfully disclosed.

23 274. Plaintiffs and the Class were the foreseeable and probable victims of any
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1 inadequate security practices and procedures. Defendants knew or should have known of the
2 inherent risks in collecting and storing the Private Information of Plaintiffs and the Class, the
3 critical importance of providing adequate security of that Private Information, and the necessity
4 for encrypting Private Information stored on Defendants' systems.

5 275. It was therefore foreseeable that the failure to adequately safeguard Class
6 Members' Private Information would result in one or more types of injuries to Class Members.
7

8 276. Plaintiffs and the Class had no ability to protect their Private Information that
9 was in, and possibly remains in, Defendants' possession.

10 277. Defendants were in a position to protect against the harm suffered by Plaintiffs
11 and the Class as a result of the Data Breach.

12 278. But for Defendants' wrongful and negligent breach of duties owed to Plaintiffs
13 and the Class, the Private Information of Plaintiffs and the Class would not have been
14 compromised.
15

16 279. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants' negligence, Plaintiffs and the
17 Class have suffered and will suffer injury, including but not limited to: (1) invasion of privacy;
18 (2) theft of their Private Information; (3) lost or diminished value of Private Information; (4)
19 lost time and opportunity costs associated with attempting to mitigate the actual consequences
20 of the Data Breach; (5) loss of benefit of the bargain; (6) lost opportunity costs associated with
21 attempting to mitigate the actual consequences of the Data Breach; (7) nominal damages; and
22 (8) the continued and certainly increased risk to their Private Information, which: (a) remains
23 unencrypted and available for unauthorized third parties to access and abuse; and (b) remains
24 backed up in Defendants' possession and is subject to further unauthorized disclosures so long
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1 as Defendants fail to undertake appropriate and adequate measures to protect the Private
2 Information.

3 280. Plaintiffs and Class Members are entitled to compensatory and consequential
4 damages suffered as a result of the Data Breach.

5 281. Defendants' negligent conduct is ongoing, since they still holds the Private
6 Information of Plaintiffs and Class Members in an unsafe and insecure manner.

7 282. Plaintiffs and Class Members are also entitled to injunctive relief requiring
8 Defendants to (i) strengthen their data security systems and monitoring procedures; (ii) submit
9 to future annual audits of those systems and monitoring procedures; and (iii) continue to
10 provide adequate credit monitoring to all Class Members.
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12
13 **COUNT II**
14 **Breach of Implied Contract**
15 **(On Behalf of Plaintiffs and the Class)**

16 283. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference all of the above paragraphs, as if
17 fully set forth herein.

18 284. Plaintiffs and Class Members were required to provide their Private Information
19 to Defendants as a condition of receiving healthcare services from Defendants.

20 285. Plaintiffs and the Class entrusted their Private Information to Defendants. In so
21 doing, Plaintiffs and the Class entered into implied contracts with Defendants by which
22 Defendants agreed to safeguard and protect such information, to keep such information secure
23 and confidential, and to timely and accurately notify Plaintiffs and the Class if their data had
24 been breached and compromised or stolen.

25 286. Implicit in the agreement between Plaintiffs and Class Members and the
26 Defendants to provide Private Information, was the latter's obligation to: (a) use such Private
27 Information for business purposes only, (b) take reasonable steps to safeguard that Private

1 Information, (c) prevent unauthorized disclosures of the Private Information, (d) provide
2 Plaintiffs and Class Members with prompt and sufficient notice of any and all unauthorized
3 access and/or theft of their Private Information, (e) reasonably safeguard and protect the Private
4 Information of Plaintiffs and Class Members from unauthorized disclosure or uses, (f) retain
5 the Private Information only under conditions that kept such information secure and
6 confidential.

7
8 287. The mutual understanding and intent of Plaintiffs and Class Members on the one
9 hand, and Defendants, on the other, is demonstrated by their conduct and course of dealing.

10 288. Defendants solicited, offered, and invited Plaintiffs and Class Members to
11 provide their Private Information as part of Defendants' regular business practices. Plaintiffs
12 and Class Members accepted Defendants' offers and provided their Private Information to
13 Defendants.

14
15 289. In accepting the Private Information of Plaintiffs and Class Members,
16 Defendants understood and agreed that they were required to reasonably safeguard the Private
17 Information from unauthorized access or disclosure.

18 290. On information and belief, at all relevant times Defendants promulgated,
19 adopted, and implemented written privacy policies whereby they expressly promised Plaintiffs
20 and Class Members that they would only disclose Private Information under certain
21 circumstances, none of which relate to the Data Breach.

22
23 291. On information and belief, Defendants further promised to comply with industry
24 standards and to make sure that Plaintiffs' and Class Members' Private Information would
25 remain protected.

26 292. In entering into such implied contracts, Plaintiffs and Class Members reasonably
27

1 believed and expected that Defendants' data security practices complied with relevant laws and
2 regulations and were consistent with industry standards.

3 293. Plaintiffs and Class Members paid money to Defendants with the reasonable
4 belief and expectation that Defendants would use part of their earnings to obtain adequate data
5 security. Defendants failed to do so.

6 294. Plaintiffs and Class Members would not have entrusted their Private Information
7 to Defendants in the absence of the implied contract between them and Defendants to keep
8 their information reasonably secure.

9 295. Plaintiffs and Class Members would not have entrusted their Private Information
10 to Defendants in the absence of their implied promise to monitor their computer systems and
11 networks to ensure that they adopted reasonable data security measures.

12 296. Plaintiffs and Class Members fully and adequately performed their obligations
13 under the implied contracts with Defendants.

14 297. Defendants breached the implied contracts they made with Plaintiffs and the
15 Class by failing to safeguard and protect their personal information, by failing to delete the
16 information of Plaintiffs and the Class once the relationship ended, and by failing to provide
17 accurate notice to them that personal information was compromised as a result of the Data
18 Breach.

19 298. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants' breach of the implied contracts,
20 Plaintiffs and Class Members sustained damages, as alleged herein, including the loss of the
21 benefit of the bargain.

22 299. Plaintiffs and Class Members are entitled to compensatory, consequential, and
23 nominal damages suffered as a result of the Data Breach.

1 300. Plaintiffs and Class Members are also entitled to injunctive relief requiring
2 Defendants to, *e.g.*, (i) strengthen their data security systems and monitoring procedures; (ii)
3 submit to future annual audits of those systems and monitoring procedures; and (iii)
4 immediately provide adequate credit monitoring to all Class Members.

5
6 **COUNT III**
7 **Invasion of Privacy—Intrusion Upon Seclusion**
8 **(On Behalf of Plaintiffs and the Class)**

9 301. Plaintiffs reallege all previous paragraphs as if fully set forth below.

10 302. Plaintiffs and the Class had a legitimate expectation of privacy regarding their
11 highly sensitive and confidential Sensitive Information and were accordingly entitled to the
12 protection of this information against disclosure to unauthorized third parties.

13 303. Defendants owed a duty to their patients, including Plaintiffs and the Class, to
14 keep this information confidential.

15 304. The unauthorized acquisition (*i.e.*, theft) by a third party of Plaintiffs' and Class
16 Members' Sensitive Information is highly offensive to a reasonable person.

17 305. The intrusion was into a place or thing which was private and entitled to be
18 private. Plaintiffs and the Class disclosed their sensitive and confidential information to
19 Defendants as part of their receipt of medical services from Defendants, but they did so
20 privately, with the intention that their information would be kept confidential and protected
21 from unauthorized disclosure. Plaintiffs and the Class were reasonable in their belief that such
22 information would be kept private and would not be disclosed without their authorization.

23
24 306. The Data Breach constitutes an intentional interference with Plaintiffs' and the
25 Class's interest in solitude or seclusion, either as to their person or as to their private affairs or
26 concerns, of a kind that would be highly offensive to a reasonable person.
27

1 307. Defendants acted with a knowing state of mind when they permitted the Data
2 Breach because they knew their information security practices were inadequate.

3 308. Defendant acted with a knowing state of mind when they failed to notify
4 Plaintiffs and the Class in a timely fashion about the Data Breach, thereby materially impairing
5 their mitigation efforts.

6 309. Acting with knowledge, Defendants had notice and knew that their inadequate
7 cybersecurity practices would cause injury to Plaintiffs and the Class.

8 310. As a proximate result of Defendants' acts and omissions, the Sensitive
9 Information of Plaintiffs and the Class were stolen by a third party and is now available for
10 disclosure and redisclosure without authorization, causing Plaintiffs and the Class to suffer
11 damages.

12 311. Unless and until enjoined and restrained by order of this Court, Defendants'
13 wrongful conduct will continue to cause great and irreparable injury to Plaintiffs and the Class
14 because their Sensitive Information are still maintained by Defendant with their inadequate
15 cybersecurity system and policies.

16 312. Plaintiffs and the Class have no adequate remedy at law for the injuries relating
17 to Defendant's continued possession of their sensitive and confidential records. A judgment for
18 monetary damages will not end Defendants' inability to safeguard the Sensitive Information of
19 Plaintiffs and the Class.

20 313. In addition to injunctive relief, Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and the other
21 members of the Class, also seeks compensatory damages for Defendants' invasion of privacy,
22 which includes the value of the privacy interest invaded by Defendants, the costs of future
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1 monitoring of their credit history for identity theft and fraud, plus prejudgment interest and
2 costs.

3
4 **COUNT IV**
5 **Violation of the Washington Consumer Protection Act**
6 **RCWA §§ 19.86.010, *et seq.*,**
7 **(On Behalf of Plaintiffs and the Class)**

8 314. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference all of the above paragraphs, as if
9 fully set forth herein.

10 315. Defendants are each a “person,” as defined by RCW 19.86.010(1).

11 316. Defendants advertised, offered, or sold goods or services in Washington and
12 engaged in trade or commerce directly or indirectly affecting the people of Washington, as
13 defined by RCW 19.86.010 (2).

14 317. Defendants engaged in unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of
15 trade or commerce, in violation of RCW 19.86.020, including:

- 16 a. By failing to implement and maintain reasonable security and privacy
17 measures to protect Plaintiffs’ and Class Members’ Private Information,
18 which was a direct and proximate cause of the data breach;
- 19 a. Failing to identify foreseeable security and privacy risks, remediate
20 identified security and privacy risks, and adequately improve security
21 and privacy measures following previous cybersecurity incidents, which
22 was a direct and proximate cause of the data breach;
- 23 b. Failing to comply with common law and statutory duties pertaining to
24 the security and privacy of Plaintiffs’ and Class Members’ Private
25 Information, including duties imposed by the FTC Act and HIPAA;
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- 1 c. Misrepresenting that they would protect the privacy and confidentiality
2 of Plaintiffs' and Class Members' Private Information, including by
3 implementing and maintaining reasonable security measures;
- 4 d. Misrepresenting that they would comply with common law and statutory
5 duties pertaining to the security and privacy of Plaintiffs and Class
6 Members' PII, including duties imposed by the FTC Act and HIPAA;
- 7 e. Omitting, suppressing, and concealing the material fact that they did not
8 reasonably or adequately secure Plaintiffs' and Class Members' Private
9 Information; and
- 10 f. Omitting, suppressing, and concealing the material fact that they did not
11 comply with common law and statutory duties pertaining to the security
12 and privacy of Plaintiffs' and Class Members' Private Information,
13 including duties imposed by the FTC Act and HIPAA.

14 318. Defendants' representations and omissions were material because they were
15 likely to deceive reasonable employees about the adequacy of Defendants' data security and
16 ability to protect the confidentiality of patients' Private Information.
17

18 319. Defendants acted intentionally, knowingly, and maliciously to violate
19 Washington's Consumer Protection Act, and recklessly disregarded Plaintiffs' and Class
20 Members' rights. Numerous past data breaches put them on notice that their security and
21 privacy protections were inadequate.
22

23 320. Defendants' conduct is injurious to the public interest because it violates
24 RCW 19.86.020, a statute that contains a specific legislative declaration of public interest
25 impact, and/or they injured persons and has the capacity to injure persons. Further, their
26 conduct affected the public interest, including the thousands of Washingtonians affected by the
27 data breach.

1 321. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ unfair or deceptive acts or
2 practices, Plaintiffs and Class Members have suffered and will continue to suffer injury,
3 ascertainable losses of money or property, and monetary and non-monetary damages, including
4 from fraud and identity theft; time and expenses related to monitoring their financial accounts
5 for fraudulent activity; an increased, imminent risk of fraud and identity theft; and their Private
6 Information’s loss of value.
7

8 322. Plaintiffs and Class Members accordingly seek all monetary and non-monetary
9 relief allowed by law, including actual damages, treble damages, injunctive relief, civil
10 penalties, and attorneys’ fees and costs.
11

12 **COUNT V**
13 **Violation of the Washington Data Breach Notification Disclosure Law**
14 **RCW 19.255.005 *et seq.***
15 **(On Behalf of Plaintiffs and the Class)**

16 323. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference all of the above paragraphs, as if
17 fully set forth below.
18

19 324. Under RCW 19.255.010(2), “[a]ny person or business that maintains or
20 possesses data that may include personal information that the person or business does not own
21 or license shall notify the owner or licensee of the information of any breach of the security of
22 the data immediately following discovery[.]”

23 325. On information and belief, this statute applies to Defendant because Defendant
24 does not own nor license the Sensitive Information exposed.
25

26 326. The Data Breach at issue constitutes a “breach of the security of the data” under
27 RCW 19.255.010.

327. Defendants violated the Washington Data Breach Notification Disclosure Law
when they failed to disclose the Data Breach to Plaintiffs and Class Members “immediately

1 following discovery” nor in a reasonable timely manner. Thus, Plaintiffs seek all available
2 relief.

3
4 **COUNT VI**
5 **Violation of the Uniform Health Care Information Act**
6 **RCW 70.02.005 *et seq.***
7 **(On Behalf of Plaintiffs and the Class)**

8 328. Plaintiffs reallege all previous paragraphs as if fully set forth below.

9 329. The Uniform Health Care Information Act (UHCIA) declares that:

10 330. “Health care information is personal and sensitive information that if improperly
11 used or released may do significant harm to a patient’s interests in privacy, health care, or other
12 interests.” § 70.02.005(1).

13 331. “In order to retain the full trust and confidence of patients, health care providers
14 have an interest in assuring that health care information is not improperly disclosed and in
15 having clear and certain rules for the disclosure of health care information.” § 70.02.005(3).

16 332. “It is the public policy of this state that a patient’s interest in the proper use and
17 disclosure of the patient’s health care information survives even when the information is held
18 by persons other than health care providers.” § 70.02.005(4).

19 333. Here, Defendants are a “health care provider” because Defendants are “licensed,
20 certified, registered, or otherwise authorized by the law of this state to provide health care in
21 the ordinary course of business or practice of a profession.” § 70.02.010(19).

22 334. Under § 70.02.020, “a health care provider, an individual who assists a health
23 care provider in the delivery of health care, or an agent and employee of a health care provider
24 may not disclose health care information about a patient to any other person without the
25 patient's written authorization.”
26
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1 trade or commerce and an unfair method of competition for the purpose of applying the
2 consumer protection act, chapter 19.86 RCW.”

3 341. Here, Defendants’ failure to secure Plaintiffs’ and Class Members’ Sensitive
4 Information—which resulted in the Data Breach—constitute violations of the Washington My
5 Health My Data Act. Thus, Plaintiffs seek all available relief.
6

7 **COUNT VIII**
8 **Unjust Enrichment**
9 **(On Behalf of Plaintiffs and the Class)**

10 342. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference all of the above paragraphs, as if
11 fully set forth herein. This claim is pleaded in the alternative to the breach of contractual duty
12 claim.

13 343. Plaintiffs and members of the Class conferred a benefit upon Defendants in
14 providing Sensitive Information to Defendants.

15 344. Defendants appreciated or had knowledge of the benefits conferred upon them
16 by Plaintiffs and the Class. Defendants also benefited from the receipt of Plaintiffs’ and the
17 Class’s Sensitive Information, as this was used to facilitate the treatment, services, and goods
18 they sold to Plaintiffs and the Class.

19 345. Under principles of equity and good conscience, Defendants should not be
20 permitted to retain the full value of Plaintiffs’ and the Class’s Sensitive Information because
21 Defendants failed to adequately protect their Sensitive Information. Plaintiffs and the proposed
22 Class would not have provided their Sensitive Information to Defendants had they known
23 Defendants would not adequately protect their Sensitive Information.

24 346. Defendants should be compelled to disgorge into a common fund for the benefit
25 of Plaintiffs and members of the Class all unlawful or inequitable proceeds received by them
26 because of their misconduct and Data Breach.
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PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and Class Members, request judgment against Defendants and that the Court grants the following:

- A. For an order certifying the Class, as defined herein, and appointing Plaintiffs and their Counsel to represent the Class;
- B. For equitable relief enjoining Defendants from engaging in the wrongful conduct complained of herein pertaining to the misuse and/or disclosure of the Private Information of Plaintiffs and Class Members, and from refusing to issue prompt, complete, and accurate disclosures to Plaintiffs and Class Members;
- C. For injunctive relief requested by Plaintiffs as is necessary to protect the interests of Plaintiffs and Class Members, including but not limited to an order:
 - i. Prohibiting Defendants from engaging in the wrongful and unlawful acts described herein;
 - ii. Requiring Defendants to protect, including through encryption, all data collected through the course of their business in accordance with all applicable regulations, industry standards, and federal, state, or local laws.
 - iii. Requiring Defendants to delete, destroy, and purge the personal identifying information of Plaintiffs and Class Members unless Defendants can provide to the Court reasonable justification for the retention and use of such information when weighed against the privacy interests of Plaintiffs and Class Members;

- 1 iv. Requiring Defendants to implement and maintain a comprehensive
2 information security program designed to protect the confidentiality and
3 integrity of the Private Information of Plaintiffs and Class Members;
4 v. Prohibiting Defendants from maintaining the Private Information of
5 Plaintiffs and Class Members on a cloud-based database;
6 vi. Requiring Defendants to engage independent third-party security
7 auditors/penetration testers as well as internal security personnel to
8 conduct testing, including simulated attacks, penetration tests, and audits
9 on Defendants’ systems on a periodic basis, and ordering Defendants to
10 promptly correct any problems or issues detected by such third-party
11 security auditors;
12 vii. Requiring Defendants to engage independent third-party security
13 auditors and internal personnel to run automated security monitoring;
14 viii. Requiring Defendants to audit, test, and train their security personnel
15 regarding any new or modified procedures;
16 ix. Requiring Defendants to segment data by, among other things, creating
17 firewalls and access controls so that if one area of Defendants’ network
18 is compromised, hackers cannot gain access to other portions of
19 Defendants’ systems;
20 x. Requiring Defendants to conduct regular database scanning and securing
21 checks;
22 xi. Requiring Defendants to establish an information security training
23 program that includes at least annual information security training for all
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1 employees, with additional training to be provided as appropriate based
2 upon the employees' respective responsibilities with handling
3 Private Information, as well as protecting the personal identifying
4 information of Plaintiffs and Class Members;

5 xii. Requiring Defendants to conduct internal training and education
6 routinely and continually, and on an annual basis to inform internal
7 security personnel how to identify and contain a breach when it occurs
8 and what to do in response to a breach;

9
10 xiii. Requiring Defendants to implement a system of tests to assess their
11 employees' knowledge of the education programs discussed in the
12 preceding subparagraphs, as well as randomly and periodically testing
13 employees' compliance with Defendants' policies, programs, and
14 systems for protecting Private Information;

15
16 xiv. Requiring Defendants to implement, maintain, regularly review, and
17 revise as necessary a threat management program designed to
18 appropriately monitor Defendants' information networks for threats, both
19 internal and external, and assess whether monitoring tools are
20 appropriately configured, tested, and updated;

21
22 xv. Requiring Defendants to meaningfully educate all Class Members about
23 the threats that they face as a result of the loss of their confidential
24 Private Information to third parties, as well as the steps affected
25 individuals must take to protect themselves;

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- 1 xvi. Requiring Defendants to implement logging and monitoring programs
2 sufficient to track traffic to and from Defendants’ servers; and
3 xvii. For a period of ten years, appointing a qualified and independent third-
4 party assessor to conduct a SOC 2 Type 2 attestation on an annual basis
5 to evaluate Defendants’ compliance with the terms of the Court’s final
6 judgment, to provide such report to the Court and to counsel for the
7 class, and to report any deficiencies with compliance of the Court’s final
8 judgment;
9
10 D. For an award of damages, including actual, nominal, treble, and consequential
11 damages, as allowed by law in an amount to be determined;
12 E. For an award of attorneys’ fees, costs, and litigation expenses, as allowed by
13 law;
14 F. For prejudgment interest on all amounts awarded; and
15 G. Such other and further relief as this Court may deem just and proper.
16

17 DATED this 13th day of June, 2025.

18 Respectfully submitted,

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